|
Balkan’s
turmoil Recent
"end of history" of Balkan "tribes" has turned
world attention once again to this spot at the tail of Europe. Three
– four hundred thousand (or even more) people killed in Bosnia, tens
thousand in Croatia and not yet established number of people killed in
Kosovo, call for an examination what could be behind these tribes’
mind (if anything apart from hatred) and what drives them to such
unseen atrocities. Also, another question is: Is Milosevic cause all
of these problems in recent history or he is just instrument for the
third attempt to establish and execute the century long dream about
"Great Serbia"; consequently what wold be happening after
him? This
compilation of historical facts will try to answer these questions and
to support thesis that Milosevic is only executor of the
"DREAM" and that "Slobo (Milosevic) will be still after
Slobo", unless Serbian people and the Church turn their attention
to the future and prosperity. Balkan
Geographical
and geopolitical location of the Balkan Peninsula Geographically
and geopolitically, the Balkans are a part of a European peninsula, on
the shores of the Mediterranean. This makes them a part of the
Mediterranean world. The Balkans’ historical destiny seems to be
reflected in the dualism between being a "border" and a
"crossroad," in the sense that civilizations, peoples,
cultures, religions, and politics all meet in the region, but they run
affront, as well. The Mediterranean region is between Europe and the
Middle East. Europe has been marked by military and political
conflicts between the West and the Ottoman Empire in late Middle Ages,
and a history of conflict between Christianity and Islam. Judaism,
Christianity (Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity), and Islam, along
with all the great ideologies of the twentieth century have meet in
this part of the world. In this area, the largest number of wars in
the history of mankind has been fought. Only after the Second World
War, forty wars have broken out in the region. Balkan
Ethnic Groups Current
events in the Balkans are better understood by studying the origins of
the people who inhabit the region. "Knowledge of the area's
national and ethnic groups is fundamental to Balkan history: they are
the alphabet, the periodic table," according to Steven
W. Sowards.
The Balkans have been inhabited since prehistoric times. but today's
ethnic groups descend from Indo-European migrants or ethnic groups who
arrived in historical times. The
Albanians
The
Albanians, or more
accurately their ancestors the Illyrians, "appeared" in the
western Balkans around 1200 BC. In 1200 BC, people in the Western
Balkans took up the cultural practices that we call "Illyrian".
Some new people probably entered the area, and some of the old
population probably remained. The
Slavs
The
Slavs reached the Balkans during the waves of "barbarian"
invasions at the end of the Roman Empire. The South Slav (Yugo-Slav)
groups which became the Slovenes, Croatians, Serbians, Montenegrian
and Bulgarians entered the Balkans from the north between 500 and 700
AD. They settled in an arc from the head of the Adriatic, south and
east to the Black Sea. These groups were divided into tribes before
they arrived, but there was little variation from one group to its
neighbours. The hard and fast distinctions among them, especially in
languages, are largely a product of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. The
Slovenes arrived first,
in the 500s AD. Slovene resembles Slovak in some ways, and is quite
distinct from Serbo-Croatian. Two million Slovenes live in the
northwest corner of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Austrian and
Italian influences have created a Central European culture and
Slovenes are chiefly Roman Catholic. Croatia
reached its medieval peak under Tomislav in the 900s, but the kings
were still weak relative to the nobility. In 1102 AD a coalition of
nobles made a deal with the Hungarian king, whose remote power was
more attractive than the nearby king's authority. Thereafter Croatia
existed as a feudal state under the kings of Hungary.
In
Macedonia, the disparate parts of the population are distinguished by
their language. In Bosnia, the defining element of ethnic identity has
been religion. Bosnians are divided according to their Catholic,
Orthodox or Muslim heritage. Bosnians of all faiths are not
necessarily devout or even active believers. Nevertheless, a family’s
historical connection with one religion or another defines its
ethnicity. This
fact tends to conceal the uniform historical population from which all
three modern groups are drawn. The mass of Bosnian Muslims are not
Turks or Albanians, not migrants to the Balkans from some Middle
Eastern country. They are Slavic speakers whose ancestors converted to
Islam in the years after the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in the 1400s.
After the Kings of Hungary became the Kings of Croatia in 1102, Bosnia
drifted out of the direct control of Hungary, and had rulers of its
own. To further their claims over Bosnia, the Hungarians persuaded the
Pope that the Bosnians were heretics, and Catholic crusaders
unsuccessfully invaded the country in the middle of the 1200s. As a
result, the Bosnian Church severed its ties to Rome, but apparently
retained its basically Catholic rituals and theology. A separate
Bosnian Church endured for some 200 years, finally fading away just
before the Ottoman conquest. Some
historians have identified the medieval Bosnian Church with a
schismatic, dualist heresy with ties to the Manichees, and attached to
it the label "Bogomil." However, recent scholarship has
failed to supply strong evidence that Bosnians were heretics, or
dualists, or called Bogomils: the original reports apparently derive
from justifications for the politically motivated crusades of the
1240s. (See Internet articles about Bosnian Identity). Montenegrian
There
are also 1 million Slavic-speaking Macedonians
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, whose ethnic affiliation
(Serbian, Macedonian or Bulgarian) is the subject of intense debate.
Macedonia was occupied at the same time as Bulgaria by south Slavs,
and the dialect resembles Bulgarian more than Serbian. Other
nationalities Most
of the ethnic groups mentioned are identified with states (the
Macedonians and Bosnians being exceptions until recently). A few other
groups have had a presence since medieval times which has not lead to
enduring political entities (Gypsies, Jewish, Germans, Turks). They
are nevertheless for this discussion less important. The
nineteenth century - Serbia
In
1800, the Balkans were divided between two dynastic empires Ottoman
and austro-Hungarian—a century later we find independent states
built on the national principle: Serbia, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria,
Montenegro, followed shortly by Albania and Hungary. The
basic outlines of nineteenth century Serbian politics were clear as
early as 1805 when Karageorge clashed with his Council, leading first
unrest which lasted from 1804-1815. After this period and a lot of
personal clashes between Karageorge and Milos Obrenovic, later took
over the power and lead Serbia towards the mid of century with more
political uncertainty and inside upheavals than before. The
rest of the century brought an even wider expansion of political
participation in Serbia and a politics that can only be called
nationalistic, for better or for worse. Serbian
nationalism from the "Nacertanije" to the Civil War In
1843, Ilija Garasanin became Minister of Internal Affairs in the
government of a new Serbian prince. Alexander Karageorgevic (the son
of the rebel Karageorge) had just replaced Michael Obrenovic, the son
of Milos Obrenovic, Serbia’s first ruling prince. Garasanin was the
son of a prosperous merchant, and a leader in the Constitutionalist
Party, who became the pivotal figure by laying foundations of the
Great Serbian policy of unification, which remained axiomatic among
the conservative political circles and individuals in Serbia until,
with more or less hidden character, the present time. In
1844 Garasanin sent a secret Memorandum to Alexander, usually refered
to by its Serbo-Croatian designation as the "Nacertanije"
(or Outline/Program), which was suggested to him by Frantisek A. Zach
(1807-1892) a Moravian enthusiastic of Slavic Reciprocity to Habsburg
and Russian influence, who suggested the Plan in hope that it will aid
the Polish independence movement. But though Garasanin clearly adopted
the new conception of Serbia linguistic nationhood, he rejected
Zach’s ideas of harmony and cooperation with others South Slavic
movements. In addition, where Zach wrote of the "South Slavic
State" or "South Slavs" Garasanin regularly turned
these phrases to "Serbia State" or simply "Serbs".
(Ivo
Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Cornell University Press,
1984) In
this document, Garasanin followed Zach’s "glorification"
of medieval Serbia and speculated on a revival of Serbia’s fortunes.
He recognized that Serbian expansion implied not only the destruction
of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, but Serbian conflict with the
Austrian Empire, which was likely to replace Turkey as the region’s
dominant power. Garasanin called Austria "the eternal enemy of a
Serbian state." Garasanin
went on to list potential territories for future Serbian rule. Of
primary interest were Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and northern
Albania, all Turkish possessions with Serbian inhabitants. Albania was
also important because it offered an outlet to the sea, a necessity to
prevent an Austrian stranglehold over Serbian foreign trade. Garasanin
was also interested in Serbs living in Banat, Backa and the Vojvodina
(districts across the Danube from Belgrade, in southern Hungary). For
pragmatic reasons, Garasanin argued against any early effort to unite
with these areas, because they belonged to Austria, a state better
able than Turkey to resist Serbia. The same caution applied to Croatia,
Slavonia and Dalmatia. Garasanin wanted more information about the
Croatian lands, although he clearly thought of them as inhabited by
related South Slavs who should have some relationship with Serbia. The
Slavs of Bulgaria also deserved less immediate attention in his
estimate, because the Ottoman grip was stronger there, and Russia was
likely to oppose an expansion of Serbia into the eastern Balkans, so
close to Istanbul. Garasanin had sympathy for the Slavic Czechs, but
recognized that they were not South Slavs; he expressed no interest in
a joint political future. The
Nacertanije is remarkable as the first elaboration of themes which
drive Serbian politics even today. Garasanin identified the core areas
of Serbian interest, recognized the ambiguous relationship of Serbs to
Croats (at a time when other Slavic thinkers in the Illyrianist and
Yugo-Slavs in Croatia did not), and accepted the inevitable conflict
of interest between Austrian state interests and those of Serbia. First
attempt to establish Great Serbia – Nacertanie I Deferring
their rival claims in Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and
Bulgaria agreed to cooperate in defiance of the Great Powers, then
made plans to throw the Turks out of Europe. In 1912, all four states
declared war on Turkey and rapidly liberated Macedonia and much of
Thrace in the First Balkan War. Serbian and Greek troops divided
Macedonia between themselves: when Bulgaria demanded a share, Greece,
Serbia and Romania fought the Second Balkan War in 1913 in order to
keep the spoils. Serbia increased in size by 82 percent, the greatest
single step so far toward Garasanin’s Great Serbian vision in the
Nacertanije. Serbian attention now turned north toward Austrian-ruled
Bosnia, Croatia and Banat.( Steven
W. Sowards) Croatian
Yugoslavism
South
Slav nationalism was not confined only to Serbia. Croats shared a
conviction that Serbs and Croats should work together for their mutual
benefit (i.e. to establish Great Croatia and Serbia). South
Slav nationalism in Croatia was based in these ideas, and also on the
historic constitutional rights of medieval Croatia. Croatians felt no
need to defer to Serbs in pursuit of their national rights. Until this
time, successful Magyar tactics of "divide and rule" had
isolated the various ethnic minorities, but in 1905 a coalition of
Serb and Croat politicians issueed the so-called "Fiume
Resolutions." Calling for autonomy and language rights, the
program also asserted that Croats and Serbs were a single people. This
display of unity alarmed ruling circles not until the end of World War
I did Croatian-style Yugoslavism briefly dictate the direction of
South Slav nationalism. Second
attempt – Nacertanie II Once
World War I began, Serbia was in a contradictory position. For the
first time, little Serbia had major Great Power allies (Britain,
Russia, France and later Italy and the U.S.) and a realistic chance to
defeat Austria-Hungary. However, Serbia was defeated on the
battlefield by 1915: the army and the government fled over the
mountains of Albania and spent the rest of the war in exile. This
battlefield defeat and the success of Yugo-Slav agitation by Croats,
both in the United States and within the Habsburg Monarchy made the
Croats "Yugoslav Committee" into an attractive ally for
Serbia and in July 1917 Pasic and the Committee issued the so-called
Corfu Declaration, which laid plans for a post war state: Yugoslavia
would be a united Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, under the
Karageorgevic dynasty. By the same Corfu Declaration Macedonia,
Bosnia, Sanjak, and Montenegro were incorporated/occupied,
consequently dismantling the Montenegrin Church and other
minorities’ identities. There
would be common citizenship for Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the rest
ethnic groups were minority and not mentioned in the Declaration or
Constitutional documents. The country would be a parliamentary
monarchy with a single unified chamber of representative elected by
direct, secret ballot. The
preamble stated that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were "the same by
blood [and] by language," and for the first time, the Pasic
ministry used the term Yugo-Slav. The balance between Serbian
centralism and Croatian federalism was left unresolved, pending a
constitutional convention. However,
each step in establishing the post-war state showed that Croatian
federalists were going to be disappointed. "Yugoslavia" was
rejected as the official name of the country in favour of the "Kingdom
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." A more serious blow fell in
1921, when a national assembly adopted a centralist constitution based
on that of pre-war Serbia. Unchallenged, it was perhaps inevitable
that the Serbs would dominate the new state. In the next 22 years,
every Prime Minister was a Serb, and most other Cabinet ministers as
well. In 1938, 161 of 165 generals were Serbs. Serbs dominated the
foreign service, the state banks, and state patronage jobs, and ran
the country to suit Serbian interests.( Steven
W. Sowards) Montenegro
The
ideology of Pan-Serbianism, to which King Nikola and most of his
people subscribed to an eminent degree, left all the passes to
Montenegro unguarded and open to Great Serbian penetration in
aftermath of Balkan and WWI. (I. Banac, 1984, The National Question in
Yugoslavia, Cornell University Press, pp: 280-1). In addition,
Nikola’s great ambition, that encountered to this defeat, was to be
accepted in the courts of Europe. Nikola managed to marry off most of
his daughters to some of the most illustious royal and princely houses
of Europe. (Two of his elder daughters Milica and Stana, were married
to two Romanov grand princes; Ana was married to a Battenberg, and
Jelena to Victor Emmanuel III, the king of Italy). Although these
marriages established Nikola as "father-in-law of Europe"
the marriage of his oldest daughter Zorka, to Petar Karadjordjevic in
1883 was the most fateful of all and forfeited him his throne and
state. In 1903 Petar, and his children left Cetinje after death of
Zorka were no longer exiles but Serbia’s new royal family, who
dedicated moreover to clear expansionist aims that boded no good for
Montenegro’s security or even its separate identity. All the way
through Balkan and WWI Serbian agents were clearly involved in
conspiracy to overturn Montenegro throne, church and its independence.
After a decade and half of intrigues, unrest, turmoil and strategic
outmaneuvers, King Nikola was forced to defeat and went into exile
leaving country into hands of Serbian protegees - "the Podgorica
Assembly" and annexed by Serbia. (Banac,
I., 1984, op. cit.) Sanjak
In
the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, Sanjak was incorporated into two
states - Serbia and Montenegro - and in the aftermath of the First
World War it became a part of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes. The emigration of the Bosniak population began at about the
same time. In April and June 1914 16,500 Bosniaks embarked ships in
the port of Bar and moved to Turkey from the Montenegrian part of
Sandzak, and 40, 000 left the Serbian part. The
emigration of the Bosniak-Muslim population continued after the
establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The
Memorandum of the Sanjak Bosniaks-Muslims adopted towards the end of
1919 stresses that since that state came into being 194 Bosniak
villages were pillaged in the southern part of Sanjak, 1,300 Bosniaks
killed. The emigration gained further momentum after the massacre of
Bosniaks-Muslims in Sahovici, Pavino Polje and Gancarevo on 11
November 1924. Part of the entire population from the Grancarevo
village went to the other side of the river Lim to Korita plain (Pester’s
Height) from where they continued to emigrate to other parts of the
"Old Yugoslavia" – Macedonia, Kosovo and Turkey, as well. The
Bosniak/Sanjak emigration was encouraged by the Yugoslav and Turkish
governments. They had several written and verbal agreements to that
effect after the First and Second World Wars. The latest in the series
of "gentleman's agreements" between the two countries was
signed in 1954. Its implementation was entrusted to a state commission,
comprising, among others, Aleksandar Rankovic, Krste Crvenkovski and
Svetislav Stefanovic. A. Rankovic was also the chief executor of a
weapon-collection campaign in Sanjak, during which repressive methods
were used against Bosniaks-Muslims and Kosovars. In the mid-Fifties,
according to the Council for Migrant Affairs, almost 200,000
Bosniaks-Muslims emmigrated from Sanjak, Kosovo and Macedonia to
Turkey. The
ethnic picture of Sandzak has changed with the new emigration wave, as
well which began with the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis and the war
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Sanjak’s Home Page). Third
Attempt to establish Greater Serbia and Croatia – Civil War
In
Yugoslavia, the result of 1989 "Berlin Wall Revolution" has
not been the creation of progressive, Western-oriented reform regimes
but instead the revival of old-fashioned regimes (often led by former
Communists)that they were pursuing traditional nationalist agendas,
often at the cost of suppressing democratic practices and human rights. Tensions
built up slowly before and during the year of revolution in 1989. Old
issues such as federalism had no more been resolved in socialist than
in royal Yugoslavia; there were North-South tensions based on cultural
and economic factors, and the overall economy was stagnant. Yugoslavia’s
awkward constitutional arrangements were one factor leading to trouble.
As a concession to critics of the Serbian centralism of the 1930s,
post-1945 Yugoslavia had six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro) in a federal relationship,
plus two autonomous regions within Serbia (each of them intended to
safeguard minority rights, for Albanians in Kosovo, and Hungarians in
Vojvodina). However,
dismantling Yugoslavia began in the face of small-scale dissent and
criticism in 1966. Croatian
Dissent
In
Croatia, the period after 1966 saw revived discussion of Croatian
nationalism. This movement began among students, but by 1971 figures
inside the Communist Party were circulating proposals for the
secession of Croatia. At this point Tito stepped in: offending
organizations were suppressed and several people went to jail. One of
them was Franjo Tudjman, the future President of Croatia, he was a
Partisan veteran, a Communist and a general, who had left the Party in
the 1960s to become an academic and a Croatian nationalist. Among his
publications were indictments of human rights violations by the party
and the state, but his writings also included defences of the wartime
Ustashe fascist regime. Serbian
Dissent
Not
only did Croatian separatism flourish, but Great Serb nationalism
re-emerged from the mid-60s. Situations of this kind fuelled Serbian
radicalism among intellectuals. In 1985, the Serbian Academy of
Sciences wrote a memorandum
(Nacertanie III) which strongly criticised Tito and the Communist
state for anti-Serb policies, noting that 30 years of Communism had
left Serbia poorer than the north. The report also condemned "genocidal"
anti-Serb policies in Kosovo, where the 10 percent Serb minority was
said to be oppressed by the Albanian majority. The Academy offered the
idea of a Serb state as a solution. The
idea of a Serb state soon was adopted by Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic.
By making a patriotic, pro-Serbian speech on the battle site of Kosovo
in 1987, Milosevic deprived the opposition of nationalism as a tool,
and made it his own. By using mass rallies that verged on mob scenes,
he coerced the Party apparatus in Montenegro and Voyvodina into
installing his allies as leaders, then curtailed autonomy in Kosovo
and Vojvodina. This
was the position at the beginning of 1990, with new leadership in
place across Yugoslavia, and the country beginning to slide into
disunity and war. Will
Slobo be still after Slobo? To
sum up this elaboration, the answer on the above question is: Until
Serbian people realise that in today’s world the Great Serbia is a
dream, Slobo will be around for some time, perhaps not with that name
but with the same politics and the same means for the same aim – to
establish the Great Serbia dream. In
addition, until Serbian Orthodox Church stops to encourage atrocities
for that dream and until helps their people to realise that the "Great
Serbia" is a past "Garasanin will be around". Will
be today’s oppositions helping to establish a modern Serbia which
would turn to future? Most of opposition parties and leaders all along
were supporting the "Memorandum for the Great Serbia" and
discredited themselves, besides, by glorifying Serbian "justifiable
war against islamisation of Europe" (Zoran Djindjic, V. Seselj,
etc.) and "by drinking plum brandy in surroundings hills with war
criminal R. Karadzic and sometimes firing on Sarajevo just for fun".
Even more, some of the opposition leaders (V. Draskovic, "Noz"
- Knife) with their writings inspired killings and slaughtering in
Bosnia, much earlier than Milosevic came to power. The
real opposition, the real modern Serbs are dispersed over the world as
a part of Milosevic’s politics. They are unfortunately still, minors
and their voice is much better heard outside of Serbia than in, where
they are "traitors" (like giant opponent from the very first
day of Milosevic’s regime – Zivoslav
Miloradovic, etc).
Conclusion
- The ethnification of politics
To
conclude this article and to support our thesis that "Slobo will
be still here even after Slobo" we will use part of the
Stavljanin, D. article "The ethniification of politics: A case
study – Serbia" (Montenegro
Journal of Foreign Policy No. 3-4/1998).
"A
political system whose central focus is ethnicity as a value in its
own right, in which ethnification is a tool which secures and
fortifies the power of the elite, it is not likely to enable social
transition in the democratic sense. As a matter of fact, transition
becomes systematically hindered because the authoritarian
ethnocentrism prevents the promotion of a pro-active civil political
culture. The logic of ethnicity leads to the atomisation of society,
which consequently narrows the space for organised interest-based
activities. On the other hand, permanent majorities and minorities
where such logic assumes, create an obstacle to the vital democratic
principle of constant change and articulation of majorities and
minorities. In a society contaminated with ethnic identities, equality
is possible only in the relations of national oligarchies. Nationally
structured are an ideal means to avoid responsibility, the basis of
every democratic society. Such a community insecurely balances between
anarchy and dictatorship. A majority of the people sense the gravity
of their situation, particularly in economic terms. Therefore, it is
essential to observe the causes in order to envisage the prospects of
overcoming such circumstances. Within the existing framework of events,
the economic difficulties are seen as an "objective"
consequence of the sanctions, and the loss of territories,
particularly in Croatia, as a result of "unreasonable decisions"
of local Serbian leaders and "unfair" treatment on the part
of the world masters. In such a position, from the point of view of
the Serbian propaganda apparatus, "owing to" the political
wisdom of president Milosevic, Serbia and the Serbian people managed
to achieve the "optimal solution" and "defend"
their national interests. Some even insist that there are also "good
points" to the embargo. This
is not only a question of manipulation but also of the fact that
Milosevic was representing the interests of majority, primarily
workers and the lower professional and vocational structures, who were
the inevitable and ultimate losers of the transitional changes.
Although he might not have convinced everyone they were Serbs before
everything else (the workers), he at least managed to secure their
jobs even in the period of sanctions. Creating a make-believe social
security, Milosevic covered up the true economic poverty of millions
of people. This mechanism is somehow still operating. While the state
is watching over their work positions saving them for some better
times, many of them support themselves through black marketeering and
tax delinquency. The government decided to tolerate it, thus making a
silent agreement between the "top" and the "bottom".
It is no wonder the poorest social groups make up the most powerful
voting machine of the ruling power. "A general idea and
perception of Serbianship implies more or less a notion of a heavenly
people, rather than of an earthly people characterized by laziness,
carelessness and worship of the German mark" (Vladimir Ilic). Combining
the left-oriented social demagogy of equality and common wealth with
nationalism, Milosevic managed to win the support of the majority.
They continue to accept the present in fear of the uncertain future.
Also, the failure of the opposition coalition "Together"
created a view with the public majority that "all politicians
were the same", in a word, egoistic, vain and corrupt. The nation
was overwhelmed by apathy, a feeling that they were not controlling
their lives, that nothing depended on them, a total confusion of
values, disorientation and a sense of powerless rage". The
ethnification of politics does not produce disastrous effects only
while its creators are in power. The grave consequences linger on even
after the staff changes, i.e. after changes in the ruling structure. A
policy whose principle value and criterion is ethnicity, which
suppresses all social potential and development. When another replaces
such a regime, the society looks like a stunted tree, unable to find
answers to the challenges of a new time, and thus becomes susceptible
to all sorts of authoritarian and totalitarian".
Hazbo
Skoko, 1999. |
|
