THE HUNTING OF THE BISMARCK
OPERATION RHEINUBUNG
HISTORY OF THE BATTLE:
THE HUNTING BEGINNING
(Drawn from: "Great German battle ships of the Second World war" of M.J. Whitley, 1989)
Lutjens was now found in a difficult position; it was yes succeeded in passing in Atlantic and it had sunk the pride of the Royal Navy but the vespiary that it was instigated it was the last thing of which it had need.
He can never know why Lutjens decided to leave to go the Prince or Wales despite the pressures of Lindemann for a decisive clash, even if the commander probably wanted to respect the orders that this type of attack prohibited and not to reapproach him to the cruisers armed with torpedos, besides the though always dangerous Prince or Wales.
Lutjens could not afford other damages and he/she knew that the English would have departed to the counterattack, as he/she knew, after the disagreeable discovery made recently, not to be escaped the good radars of the hostile cruisers yet.
The British Admiralty assembled all of its strengths in the northern Atlantic, leaving only three cruisers (Manchester, Birmingham and Arethusa) of it patrols I widen some point oriental north of Iceland to stop Lutjens in the case in which it returned on its footsteps.
In theory, therefore, Lutjens would be been able to return in country if it had decided to interrupt gets it, but in reality the English followed every movement of his both from the sea and from the sky with six Beauforts of the squadron n° 22 of Kaldadarnes.
To Kiel meanwhile the GROUP Nord knew only that two cruisers had put on on the wake of its ships, thanks to the decipherings of the hostile messages.
With to spend some times, the morning of 24 became evident that had entered in contact other two hostile unities, you identify only from the respective codes radio, OTT and OVY.
To the 17.17 Carlses it received a relationship deciphered of the OVY that the Bismarck gave to 17 miles distance (that transmitted to 24 the 05.37 by the Prince or Wales), follows at 07.35 o'clock from one of the OTF (transmitted to the 05.43 dalls' Hood), that communicated rout and distance of Lutjens to Scapa Flow.
Take for granted the patrol of the narrow one, Carls was not caught in the act by the interceptions English, but it didn't know what those on the wake of the Bismarck were two battleships, as it didn't know if the Prinz Eugen was supplied in the Arctic one or from the Bismarck, for which he/she thought that Lutjens needed urgent fuel.
You explains so the message transmitted to Lutjens by the GROUP Nord with the contained following:
(to) to Specify position (by now compromised), situation and intentions.
(b) presumed Intentions: (the) to escape the pursuers to allow the Prinz Eugen to make restocking. (ii) to drag the enemy above the U-boats of it patrols.
(c) to Inform about the situation the officer of command U-boat.
(d) Á. the 12.00 the command would have passed to the GROUP (and) Three destroyer they were to Trondheim but the
Weissenburg was in action.
The first dark sign on as the things they were it reached the hands of Carls at 11.16 o'clock; it was a message deciphered that "The unity Hood is not reappearance anymore", but the admiral was able some to know that the Hood had stopped existing.
For midday, thanks to the counterespionage radio could trace the run of the Bismarck with enough precision to pass the command to the GROUP Ovest according to the programs at 12.00 o'clock.
Of Lutjens however he/she was not known anything yet; its message was gained only at 13.35 o'clock and up to the 15.05 it didn't receive the text decoded that it said: " Sunk battle cruiser, probably the Hood.
Seriously damaged, another battleship, King George V or Renown follow us two cruisers."
The 06.32 had been transmitted to. At 15.05 o'clock another message of Lutjens arrived, transmitted at 08.01 o'clock and received to the 13.40, that it communicated some particular in more as the reduction to 28 knots of the maximum speed for the loss of two generating n° 4 and for the flood of the room boilers n°2 to the left.
It referred besides the ampleness of the narrow one of Denmark but not the presence of mines and, thing more important, that the ships crumbs were endowed with radar. Lutjens finally communicated the intention to go himself/herself/themselves to St. Nazaire, while the Prinz Eugen continued to attach the merchantmen.
Carls was obviously worried for the delay with which the messages had reached the GROUP Nord, but it thoughts that some cannonade had to have to damage the spar of transmission.
It was perplexed instead from the intentions of Lutjens, some damage didn't justify the interruption of the operazione.
To way it a plan in the case that Lutjens decided to return in the Sea of the North: it temporarily held back You to her flotilla of destroyer, destined wings French westerner, it ordered to the command of the U-boats to also patrol the narrow one among the Faers 0er and Iceland and churches the support of the unities of attack and recognition of the Luftwaffe.
At 16.59 o'clock a nth message of Lutjens communicated that I'Hood had gone to fund in less than five minutes while mezz'ora after the Luftwaffe signalled really the Hood among the ships individualized to Scapa Flow during a recognition admitting the unfavorable conditions of the time.
Some explanation on the intentions of Lutjens came with the 14.48 message, recorded by the KTB of the GROUP 5 hours and a half later. The commander would have tried to vanish itselves some pursuers during the night, in case of failure it would have attracted them in the square AJ68, where churches to send one patrols of submarines.
In the afternoon of May 24 Bismarck and Prinz Eugen continued toward south and the admiral Wake-Walker it followed the wake of fuel in gone out of the leaks in the reservoirs of the battleship with Norfolk, Suffolk and Prince of Wales. The German ships had been being favorite for the time that it went deteriorandsi, but, thanks to the radars, the enemy maintained that contact that Liitjens intended to interrupt for allowing his/her cruiser to continue the mission. It communicated to the Captain Brinkmann that to the opportune moment, in a squall, the Bismarck would have veered to west, while he had to continue on the same rout for 3 hours, to supply him of fuel and to begin the operations.
In the meantime the Admiral Tovey with the Home Fleet, King George V, Victorious, Repulse and the cruisers of the II Squadra, sailed southwest to intercept him/it. Over that the relationships of Wake-Walker, Tovey could exploit those some Coastal Command RAF, even if by now only the Catalinas you/they could arrive on the enemy from Iceland. L 'L/240 located the Germans in the afternoon and the G/210 it did the last gotten.
Lutjens opened the fire against both more than once uselessly, then, toward the 15.40, definite that the moment had come and, as you/he/she was invested by a squall, it ordered to perform the separation.
The Bismarck increased the speed to 28 knots, it veered to right-hand, but going out of the clouds was found really in front of the enemy and it was forced to rejoin him with the Prinz Eugen.
The second attempt succeeded, instead at 18.14 o'clock, when, after having detached the cruiser, Lutjens hocked the Suffolk and the Prince of Wales in a brief clash to long distance, but not getting some result returned to make rout toward south.
The GROUP Ovest received an unhappy account: "the Prinz Eugen will be sent to make restocking", from which could not be understood that the manoeuvre had succeeded without the enemy if it realized of it, while the cruiser obviously maintained the silence radio.
Despite this first success, Lutjens despaired to free himself/herself/themselves some cruisers English; at 20.56 o'clock in fact it communicated to the general quartier that, not could escape the hostile radars, it would have aimed straight at Saint Nazaire to give him some fuel, abdicating to attract the pursuers in the zone of the U-boats.