THE HUNTING OF THE BISMARCK
OPERATION RHEINUBUNG
STORIA DELLA BATTAGLIA:
THE OPERATION BEGINS
(Drawn from: "Great German battle ships of the Second World war" of M.J. Whitley, 1989)
Following the delays of which above the Bismarck could go out in the bay to supply him of fuel midday solo of May 18 and to the 02.00 of the day later finally taken the sea. The operation was initiated "Rheinubung."
You escort from the destroyer 225 and Eckoldt, preceded by the Sperrbrecher, the two heavy unities moved to west toward the great belt. A third destroyer, the Lody, reached her from Kiel, while a quarter, the Galster, accused the usual problems to the motors.
You overcome the belts and the Kattegat, the team entered the Skagerrak on May 20 and had the adversity of perceives - king and to be sighted by the Swedish cruiser Gotland in the first hours of the day.
Concluded Lutjens that the enemy would have known soon about its departure and it immediately informed the GROUP Nord. Surprisingly Carls responded that, gives the hold Swedish neutrality, it held unlikely that the news of their movements could reach the ears of the English, and in this way it threw the seed of the failure of the operation. The answer of Carls is inexplicable even more if it is considered that on January 25 the SKL and he already knew that the harbor's representative English in Stockholm had communicated the exact time when Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had crossed the belts in London. It stays to understand because has already chosen this compromised rout after having remembered this episode on March 23, recognizing the efficiency of the British spy net in Denmark and in Sweden.
The team of the Bismarck overcame Kristiansand on May 20 before midnight and to the 04.40 of the following day it made rout toward north under a clear of sky with a light breeze. Almost contemporarily the Operational Division of the - the admiralty communicated a message of the representative of the harbor to the general quartier of the Coastal Command to Stockholm, that the sighting signalled to Marstrand (15.00 around of May 20) of two heavy unities not identified escorted by three destroyer and direct northwestern.
To the 21 first lights the aerial de118s" group they immediately departed for patrolling the waters between Trondheim and Naze, but the Germans picked up and they deciphered the order to look for two big ships and three destroyer transmitted away radio and the squadron it mended in the fiord of Kors before the nearest instrument (the Blenheim H/254) he could individualize it.
Just before midday the Prinz Eugen threw he/she anchors him in the bay of Kalvanes and the Bismarck to Grimstadtfjord.
The white and black mimetic strips, here too much evident, with grey varnish and all the ships were covered except the battleship they were supplied of fuel. In the meantime a scout English 'that you/he/she had photographed her it signalled theirs placed - zione to the 6 Whitleys of the squadron n" 612, to 10 Hudsons of the n" 220 and twos of the n" 269, but when these arrived on the objective the sky it had clouded and the ships were already set sail.
Left the shelter of the Norwegian fiords, Lutjens continued toward north detaching the destroyer to Trondheim to the 04.20 of May 22. Thanks to the clouds and the haze their departure escaped the RAF, that prepared an attack aerosilurante on Wick with 30 Hampdens and the Beauforts of the squadron n° 42.
You give the conditions of the time, they took off only the scouts, then a bench of clouds to 100 feet they also postponed these to earth.
The Admiralty was definite however to rouse the Bismarck, so much that, despite the prohibitive conditions, a..! Maryland of the squadron n° 771 took off from Hatston with on board two volunteers and it reached the fiord discovering him/it by now desert.
It didn't stay whether to send the Sunderlands in recognition along the Norwegian coast, to Stavanger and Bergen, between the Shetlands and the Faers 0er and between these and Iceland, while the Catalinas patrolled the north of Iceland and the narrow one of Denmark.
The flights however you/they were limited or I suspended for the bad time, therefore the harbor intervened with the Hood, the Prince of Wales and 6 destroyer, after having given the alarm to various cruisers of it patrols, while the admiral Tovey held his flagship King George he Goes Scapa Flow with 5 cruisers and 5 destroyer, in attended that the situation was clarified.
In Germany meanwhile, during a meeting to Berghof on May 22, Raeder shortly reported to the Fuhrer that the Bismarck was in sea and convinced him/it not to call her/it back.
To the sinking of the Bismarck any official elderly didn't survive, therefore you/they can be made only some conjectures on the thoughts of Lutjens during the operation. Even the only survivor ignored what you/he/she was said and done on the bridge of the ship in that days.
He is not known well when and on that he found the commander it decided not to pass among the Faers 0er and Iceland, but between the midnight of May 21 and 22 the 12.00 it aimed straight to north for the south channel of Iceland. Always before midday you also have to decide not to supply him from the Weissenburg as foreseen.
In the orders given to the Prinz Eugen it is implied that the time was ideal for the crossing, even if on him in heavy cruiser doesn't result any communication of the meteorological service. Lutjens decided to pass from the narrow one of Denmark, probably because he believed that the English were still in the dark of his departure and he didn't want to give them the time to discover it and to wait for other unities in the narrow one while he wasted time with the restocking of fuel.
For the whole afternoon and the evening, therefore, the two ships followed the rout that had to bring her to the northern opening of the narrow one of Denmark and with to spend some times the time it did more and more him favorable thanks to a strong wind of southwest. Besides the clouds and to the haze it also started to rain.
The order departed to cover of grey the top of the towers and to cancel the swasticas, but he/she anchors he/she was not known if the big one of the fleet English was for sea since the airplanes of the Luftwaffe were forced to earth from the bad time as those of the RAF.
The few available information seemed to point out that hunting was not begun on wide staircase yet. To slow evening visibility reduced him to alone 300-400 ms, in some points also to less, so much that the two ships lost him sight and second the meterorologo of the Prinz Eugen the cloudiness reached south of Greenland. In Iceland the new Hudsons of the squadron n° 2 lay unused on the footstep under a bench of clouds to 30 earth meters.
A hour before midnight the GROUP Ovest communicated
what probably the operation Rheinubung had not been open yet.
In rout of Or-S-or, Lutjens followed the coast north of Iceland as long as at 19.00 o'clock it reached the limit of the ices. Until there had not been here sign of pattuglie English, except a forgery alarm provoked by an iceberg. The last meteorological relationships confirmed the ugly time south hips but the horizon over the ices it was clear and haze continued to east. It snowed adrift to intermittence and the two ships zigzag procedettero among the blocks of ice.
Suddenly, at 19.20 o'clock, the Bismarck entered alarm for a contact signalled by the radar and by the hydrophones and the look-outs they confirmed the presence of a ship from war to three chimneys. It dealt with the heavy cruiser Suffolk, that flowed the two German unities while it was veering southwest to estrange from the ices and that it signalled the sighting quickly returning to hide himself/herself/themselves in the fog.
It is not certain yet if, as it results from the relationships of the Prinz Eugen, the flagship has launched some position against the enemy, to every way the Suffolk succeeded in taking a stand on the wake of the two German ships.
Around a hour after a second cruiser, the Norfolk (Rear-admiral Wake-Walker), it came into contact with the team and it replaced the Suffolk with the pursuit. All of a sudden the Norfolk drew near too much and you/he/she was punished with a discharge of artillery. On the escort of the relationships of the two cruisers the admiralty instructed the strengths in Atlantic to face the upcoming enemy, while to the GROUP Nord at 20.34 o'clock the Admiral Carls individualized the first segl1alis of danger in the message sent by Lutjens at 20.15 o'clock ("A heavy cruiser AD29") and he immediately sent in recognition on ScapaFlow the Fliegerfiihrer Nord and the Luftflotte 5. 17 minutes later it was him with - also marked the deciphering of the message transmitted by the Suffolk.
The Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen were too much distant to be helped somehow from the Luftwaffe; you/they would have been alone up to the zone of the U-boats in Atlantic and Carls it didn't have idea of thing it prepared the enemy because the time had stopped the recognitions in this crucial moment.
L' Admiral Tovey was set sail by Scapa Flow with the Home Fleet the evening of 22 and you/he/she was found in sea. It didn't receive the relationship of the Suffolk and that of the Norfolk it reached him/it while it was already sailing toward the southern mouth of the narrow one of Denmark, where he/she thought they were direct also the Germans.
Tovey was still however to east south of Iceland, while the Deputy Admiral Holland, that had picked up the message of the Suffolk, 300 south was found miles of the hostile ships, in good position to attach her, with the Hood, the Prince of Wales and six destroyer.
Also the Coastal Command was busy in the searches, with the Sunderlands of the squadron n° 201 of Reykjavik him Hudson of the n° 269 of Kaldadarnes.
The counterblows of the cannonades shot to the Norfolk had damaged the radar of the Bismarck making him/it useless, therefore the Prinz Eugen received the order to pass in first position and this movement you/he/she would not have remained without consequences. In the first hours of May 23 the sky was entirely covered with loaded clouds of snow.
Despite this the men of the B Dienst, that had immediately deciphered the relationships of the cruisers, reported that the enemy knew exactly the changes of rout and speed of the team "Rheinubung." With a certain worry they deduced that the English had to have a radar and that it was not certain inferior to that German. You/they were not been wrong, the new Type 284 of the Suffolk and the oldest Type 268P of the Norfolk were tenaciously held in contact despite the conditions of the time.