THE HUNTING OF THE BISMARCK
OPERATION RHEINUBUNG
HISTORY OF THE BATTLE:
THE PROBLEMS BEGIN
(Drawn from: "Great German battle ships of the Second World war" of M.J. Whitley, 1989)
The meteorological problems, of restocking and of recognition that we will now examine, they shortly show the entity of I strive him/it in demand to the auxiliary strengths for one gotten of the unities of surface, in open contrast with the employment of the U-boats, that you/they also needed tenders. The plans of the operation entered crisis once more April 22, when the Prinz Eugen, in trip from Gotenhafen to Kiel, victim of a magnetic mine remained and you has to mend in the yard.
To postpone away the meant to be himself/herself/themselves to north in the least favorable period, at the end of May, when the nights without moon would have left the place to the northern aurora, for which the dilemma was set to attend or less that the cruiser was mended.
There were three possibilities: (to) to send only the Bismarck and to take advantage of the change of moon, (b) to wait for the following moon to have all and two the ships, or (c) to wait only that the cruiser was ready without keeping in mind of the moon. L' Admiral Carls slanted for the first solution, but I'SKL opted instead for the last one.
On April 25, to the light of the delay provoked by the Prinz Eugen, the Grand'Ammiraglio Raeder summoned Liitjens to Berlin to discuss the operation. Lutjens was obviously very disappointed, considering that the native plan of an action combined of the German team with that of Brest was gradually reduced to the departure of two only unities, while Raeder desired to put in sea the ships before USA intervened.
Lutjens would have liked to wait at least to be able to have the Scharnhorst, if not the Tirpitz but Raeder justly he opposed because gives the situation of Brest the Scharnhorst it risked other damages before the reparations were finished. Speaking of the Tirpitz, instead, the Kriegsmarine and Raeder particularly it planned in very different way the entrance in action of a ship in comparison to the Royal Navy.
Gives the intolerance of Raeder on the six months of training, the Tirpitz you/he/she would not obviously have been able to participate in the operation. With all probability the decision to make to set sail as soon as possible the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen it was motivated from the fears of the intervention USA, more easily predictable for Raeder that for Lutjens.
Raeder he was moving on two foreheads to favor his/her strengths of surface and submarine busy on the Atlantic commercial routs and with the guarantee of Hitler it ordered to ignore entirely or partly the waters of American neutral patrol and (b) to attach merchant USA according to the rule - international chin. Seen the warmth of the American reactions to the German country in the Balkans, it believed that the realization of these directives didn't have to provoke the entrance in war of the United States, even if in the depth it had to feel otherwise, so much to be pressed for the immediate throwing of the "Rheinubung."
It advanced his/her proposals to the Fhurer April 20 th 1941, almost without mentioning the operation. The yards also worried him/it for its heavy unities, well knowing the risks of those of Brest, therefore it premises for the conquest of Ferrol in Spain. Pushing before also for the occupation of Norway and of Greece then, made Raeder him responsible of a lot of sufferings during the second world war.
To every way, Hitler didn't approve his/her proposals, also leaving him the hope that the things could change during the operation "Rheinubung", for which the admiral instructed according to the plain his/her Lutjenses, that he left again definite to follow the orders. On his/her behalf Hitler had been enough lukewarm speaking of her "Rheinubung" and it doesn't surprise that it had little time to devote to the head of the harbor in the imminence of a colossal enterprise as the invasion of Russia.
You complete the reparations of the Prinz Eugen they took over other delays so much that Lutjens could communicate to be ready only for the street on May 16. The GROUP Nord provident to ask to the airplanes of the Fliegerfiihrer Atlantik to verify the conditions of the ice in the narrow one of Denmark il19 and to the command in Norway to send in posting for il221a Weissenburg and I'Heide, each with 7.000 m3s of fuel and restocking for one month.
The other tenders set sail from the French western coast, you follow 17 and on May 18 from the two Spahiffes Gonzenheim and Kota Penang.
The operational orders recommended, if the time were favorable, immediately to try 10 narrow between Iceland and the Faers 0er after the departure from Norway. In contrary case Lutjens had to aim toward the Arctic one, to meet the Weissenburg to 70°N, 1°0 (Punkt Hans) and to do the full one of fuel to be able to storm in ocean to all speed. Contemporarily the Weissenburg would have left the posting to the Heide to guarantee a second complete restocking if the attempt were bankrupt.
On May 1°, while the Bismarck was anchored to Gotenhafen waiting for orders for the departure, Hitler it climbed on board for an inspection with a thick succession of Nazi potentates. Raeder was elsewhere and Karl Topp of the Tirpitz formally asked to include his/her ship in gets her/it, but it was everything useless and four hours after the Fuhrer it returned to earth.