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GRAN BRETAGNA
ROYAL NAVY - GRAN FLEET
-INCROCIATORI DA BATTAGLIA - BATTLECRUISERS -
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- H.M.S. 51 HOOD -
(Mighty Hood)
HOOD BATTLECRUISER
"Ventis Secundis "
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( Written by Glendon Pryor )
Operation Rheinübung was to consist of the newly completed battleship Bismarck, the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen under the co}mand of Admiral Gunther Lutjens. In previous operations the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau where ordered not to engage heavy units of the British Fleet. This resulted in the farcical retreat of the two modern battlecruisers in the face of the old battleship Malaya, and the sacking of Fleet Admiral Marschall for disobeying orders and having the nerve to engage and sink the aircraft carrier Glorious and her two escorting destroyers.
With Operation Rheinübung permission was granted for Bismarck to engage any convoy escort while the battle cruisers and Prinz Eugen sank the convoy.
Such a force would also have had the necessary speed to escape from any concentration of forces that the Admiralty would have been likely to deploy. The only capital ships in the British fleet, capable of catching them, were the three battlecruisers (Hood, Renown and Repulse) but these were all old ships whereas the German vessels were modern.
Before the sailing date Scharnhorst's troublesome boilers needed a refit, reducing the operational strength to Bismarck, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen.
On the 2nd April 1940, preparatory orders where issued for Gneisenau to rendezvous with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in the Atlantic for a combined attack on allied shipping.
On 4th April 1940 a bomb landed next to No 8 dock were Gneisenau was berthed without exploding. Gneisenau was moved to a mooring in the harbour. On the 6th April she was attacked by Flying Officer Campbell who before he and his crew were killed, managed to hit her with a torpedo which destroyed a propeller shaft, flooded two engine rooms and put her out of action for six months.
Operation Rheinübung was now reduced to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Admiral Lutjens favoured delaying the operation until Scharnhorst or Tirpitz was ready. Captain Topp in the Tirpiz declared her fit for sailing, however Grand Admiral Raeder was not convinced and the operation proceeded with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.
The Break Out
C-in-C Home fleet Admiral Tovey in the King George V knew that both Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had completed their training and new that new charts had been supplied to both. The amount of German air activity had increased, as well new battleship moorings being prepared at Brest. It was obvious that they were going to put to sea soon.
On the 18th May the Cruiser Suffolk in the Denmark Straits was ordered to be on the lookout for the ships and her sistership Norfolk was dispatched to join her. The cruisers Manchester, and Birmingham patrolled the Iceland-Faeroes passage together with five trawlers.
At Scapa Flow the two new battleships King George V and Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser Hood and aircraft carrier Victorious rested at anchor. The battlecruiser Repulse was off the Clyde.
Tovey divided his fleet into two squadrons, one with King George V and Repulse, the other with Hood (Flag, ViceAdmiral L. E. Holland) and Prince of Wales.
On the evening of 21st May 1941 Hood and Prince of Wales together with six destroyers, Electra, Anthony, Echo, Icarus, Achates, Antelope were leaving Scapa Flow. Holland had orders to proceed to Iceland to refuel, then to patrol the Iceland-Greenland and Iceland-Faeroes gaps.
At almost the same time, Bismarck, accompanied by the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, sailed from Korsfiord, near Bergen, Norway, destined for the Atlantic.
Tovey waited in Scapa with King George V and Victorious for news of the Germans intentions.
Air recognisance on 22nd May revealed that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had sailed. News reached Tovey at 7:45hours that Bergin Fiord was empty. At 22.45 hours, King George V sailed westward from Scapa Flow, in company with the carrier Victorious, the cruisers Aurora, Galatea, Kenya and Hermione, and seven destroyers, Ingelfield, Intrepid, Active, Punjab, Windsor, Lance. At 07.10 hours on 23rd May, this group of ships was joined by Repulse and three destroyers that had sailed north from the Clyde and the entire force set a northeasterly course, to patrol an area covering the IcelandFaroes passage.
The cruiser Arethusa was instructed to join Birmingham and Manchester in the Iceland-Faeroes passage.
Contact with Bismarck
At 19.22 hours on 23rd May, the cruiser Suffolk, patrolling in Denmark Strait, sighted Bismarck and Prinz Eugen and, maneuvering to place herself astern of the enemy, she began shadowing them with her radar; one hour later, she was joined by a sister ship, Norfolk.
It was not until 20.32 hours on 23rd May, when one of Norfolk's sighting reports was picked up, that Admiral Tovey learned that Bismarck was in the Denmark Strait. No major alteration of his existing position was required, however, because the westnorthwesterly course of the fleet was already carrying him towards the enemy.
Patrolling the southwest coast of Iceland, 300 miles to the south, was a force consisting of Hood, Prince of Wales and four destroyers. (Six destroyers were originally with this force, but two had been detached earlier, to refuel in Iceland.) At 19.39 hours, this force picked up one of Suffolk's many sighting reports, and at 19.54 hours, Admiral Holland ordered his ships to increase speed to twenty-seven knots and to steer 295 degrees on an interception course.
For Admiral Holland the pursuit had gone wrong. With Suffolk's regular sighting reports he had planned to move off ahead of Bismarck, then swing towards her at a closing speed of over 50 knots. Using the light he would still be in darkness, while Bismarck would be silhouetted against the sunset. For this plan to work he required a constant stream of reports from Suffolk, he also had to maintain radio silence so that Bismarck would not be alerted. He also expected that Norfolk and Suffolk would engage Prinz Eurgen, but because of the need for radio silence Wake-Walker was not informed.
This was an ambitious plan and might have worked except that at 12:38 Suffolk temporarily lost contact. Holland was now forced to guess the course of Bismarck and at 02.05 hours on 24th May, the force altered course to 200 degrees and Admiral Holland ordered Prince of Wales to search ahead with her Type '284' gunnery radar set. The battleship's commander, Captain Leach, asked if he might use the Type '281' set because the Type '284' was defective, but permission was refused on the grounds that this set would interfere with Hood's Type '284'. The four destroyers were dispatched to search to the north. They passed within ten miles of Bismarck, however as visibility was down to three to five miles they did not sight her.
Just before 03:00 hours Suffolk signaled that she had regained Bismarck. Holland was now in a dangerous position. Instead of closing Bismarck head on at 50knots covered by darkness, he was forced to close slowly and at a wide angle. At 03.40 hours, course was altered to 240 degrees to converge with the enemy, and thirteen minutes later, speed was increased to twenty-eight knots. At 05.10 hours, the ships were brought to full action stations, and at 05.37 hours, Prince of Wales signaled "enemy in sight, distance seventeen miles" as the ships once more changed course to 280 degrees, in order to close the range.
Clash of the Titans
Hood, with Prince of Wales off her starboard quarter, was now approaching the enemy at such an angle that only her forward turrets could be brought to bear. Prince of Wales moreover, had a defect in one of her forward guns, which was only able to fire in the first salvo. The disadvantages of the endon appr&127;ach, however, were justified by the need to close the range as rapidly as possible in order to get within a range where the ill-protected decks of Hood were not vulnerable to plunging shell.
The angle of approach meant that the British ships were steaming at high speed into the wind, the spray made use of the large 30-foot rangefinders in Hoods A and B turrets impossible as well as the 41-foot rangefinder in Prince of Wales A and the 30-foot in her B Turret. The 15-foot rangefinder in the Main Director was not as accurate and it would take longer to find the range. Reducing the armament in half also presented problem with the gunnery methods used to find the range. The British, as did the Germans, used a ladder system of finding the correct range.
In Hood she would divide her main armament into two with A and B turrets acting as one and X and Y Turrets acting as the other. A and B fire at the assumed range, before the fall of shot X and Y fire at assumed range plus 400 yards. The guns would then alternate getting closer and closer. Once the range was found full broadsides would commence. With only A and B able to bear Hood and Prince of Wales would take longer to find the correct range.
At 05.49 hours the British ships both turned 20 degrees to starboard, slightly increasing the angle of approach, and Admiral Holland ordered fire to be concentrated on the left hand ship, which had been erroneously identified as Bismarck. In fact, the leading ship was Prinz Eugen, and the gunnery officer of Prince of Wales, realising this, transferred his attention to the second ship in the enemy line. The mistake was also discovered in the flagship which, a few seconds before fire was opened, hoisted the signal "shift target right", but there is some doubt as to whether this order was received by the gunnery office of Hood
Shortly after 05.52 hours, Hood opened fire at a range of 26,500 yards, followed half a minute later by Prince of Wales. At 05.55 hours the British ships turned back onto a course of 280 degrees and at that moment the enemy opened fire on Hood. Bismarck's first salvo fell short, the second was over and the third straddled. Prinz Eugen scored a hit or hits which started a fire among Hood's ready use antiaircraft ammunition on the shelter-deck. At 06.00 hours, with the range down to about 14,500 yards, Admiral Holland ordered his ships to turn 20 degrees to port so as to bring their full broadsides to bear. As this order was being executed, Bismarck's fifth salvo straddled Hood, scoring one, or perhaps two hits. A sheet of flame was seen to leap into the air from the vicinity of the flagship's mainmast, followed by a tremendous explosion which broke the ship in two. The after part sank very quickly while the fore part sank in three minutes. There were three survivors from the crew of 1,418 officers and men.
Prince of Wales had to alter course to avoid the wreckage of Hood. Up to this time, the battleship had been operating undisturbed, but with the loss of the flagship, she became the target for the concentrated fire of both enemy ships. During the following twelve minutes, Prince of Wales was hit by seven 15inch and 8inch shells, and at 06.13 hours, it was decided to break off the action and retire. This decision was prompted by the fact that 'A' turret had jammed and was partially flooded, 'Y' turret was out of action and several of the 14inch guns had jammed in elevation. The 1oss of 'Y' turret was due to the shell ring in 'Y' shell room having become jammed when a 14inch shell was accidentally dropped into its training mechanism it took more than two hours to make this turret fully operational again. Bismarck continued on her southwesterly course shadowed from a respectable distance, by Norfolk, Suffolk and Prince of Wales.
Prince of Wales had straddled Bismarck with her sixth salvo, despite her defective Type '284' radar and the teething troubles of her gunmountings. After Hood had sunk, she switched on her Type '281' airwarning radar set which she used to determine the range of the enemy, with some considerable success. She straddled Bismarck several times before breaking off the action. The problems with the main armament were entirely the result of mechanical breakdowns, and errors in drill, and were not a result of enemy action.
Prince of Wales had only recently commissioned and was not fully worked up. Many civilians were still on board making adjustments to the armament when the ship sailed to intercept Bismarck.
After the Battle
Bismarck did not emerge from this action unscathed. She had been hit three times by 14inch shells from Prince of Wales. One shell had penetrated an oilfuel tank causing a serious oil leak and contaminating the oil fuel in adjacent tanks. Another had struck the side armour amidships, causing a leak, and subsequent flooding put one dynamo and one boiler out of action, reducing her maximum speed by two knots. The third hit caused only minor damage.
Lutjens now had a serious problem on board Bismarck, one he had partially created himself. The hit on the oil tank had seriously depleted the fuel oil, which was further compounded by Lutjens not refueling from the tankers Weissenbung or Wollen. Bismarck had not refueled from Wollen despite having used 1000 tons. Lutjens must have now regretted that decision.
As a result, Bismarck's proposed Atlantic sortie was abandoned, and the commander of the German force, Admiral Lutjens, decided to make for France where repairs could be carried out.
The British shadowing force of Norfolk, Suffolk and Prince of Wales under the command of Wake-Walker was to suffer from one of the strangest signals from the Admiralty. The First Sea Lord asked his "intention were about Prince of Wales re-engaging". All officers are sensitive about the charge of lack of offensive spirit; Wake-Walker struggled with the signal before replying that Prince of Wales was waiting the arrival of Tovey with King George V and Repulse before re-engaging. However the damage was done, and against the wishes of his staff he changed the shadowing dispositions with Prince of Wales taking the lead with Norfolk and Suffolk astern. He also formed the ships into a line-ahead formation. One not suited to shadowing but more suited to a battle-line.
Wake-Walker planned to close Bismarck with Prince of Wales, attack and try and lure her eastwards towards Tovey. Before he could implement this Bismarck in order to allow Prinz Eurgen to escape into the Atlantic turned back on her shadowers. Bismarck fired three salvos, Prince of Wales replied with twelve before turning away.
After the loss of Hood, Tovey and the fleet altered course to bring it onto a direct interception course which was progressively altered as new reports of Bismarck's position were received.
On 24th May the US Coast Guard Cutter Modoc had the experience of watching Bismarck sail by. Bismarck had been warned by Group North to expect the ship and there was no problems. Unfortunately the British ships had not been informed of her presence and Wake-Walker signaled Prince of Wales to open fire. The crew on Modoc had the awful experience of watching Prince of Wales guns turn towards them. Luckily she was recognised and Prince of Wales swung away.
The fleet was on a southwesterly course in a position to the east of Bismarck, and it was hoped that contact would be made at about 09.00 hours on the following morning. At 04.00 hours, Admiral Tovey detached Victorious and four cruisers, ordering them to close the enemy sufficiently to allow an air strike by the carrier's Swordfish. This later resulted in one torpedo hit on Bismarck which did little damage. It did, however, increase the rate of flooding through the existing hull damage.
Bismarck Escapes
Because of the battle-line that Wake-Walker had ordered and the need to zig-zag to avoid U-Boats at 3:30hours on the morning of 25th May, Suffolk lost contact with Bismarck. Admiral Tovey continued on his southwesterly course and actually crossed ahead of the enemy vessel's course. At 09.06 hours, Repulse, which was running low on fuel, separated from the flagship and headed for Newfoundland. At 10.47 hours, King George V altered course to the northeast, Admiral Tovey mistakenly thinking that Bismarck was breaking back towards the IcelandFaeroes passage. It was 18.10 hours before the C in C realised his error and turned onto a southeasterly course towards the coast of France. He was now 150 miles behind the enemy and the chances of catching up were beginning to look remote.
Bismarck Spotted
At 10.30 hours on 26th May, Bismarck was relocated, by a Catalina aircraft of Coastal Command, about 130 miles south of King George V.
At 18.00 hours on 26th May, King George V was joined by Rodney which took up a position astern of the flagship. Tovey signaled Rodney "What is your maximum speed" Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton in Rodney replied 22-knots. Soon Rodney was falling behind King George V and Dalrymple-Hamilton signaled to Tovey "I am afraid that your 22 knots is a bit faster than ours". By this time, the fuel situation in the battleships was becoming critical, and it was clear that unless Bismarck were slowed down, it was unlikely that she would be brought to action. Tovey slowed the fleet to conform with Rodney's "22-knots". Rodney had been diverted from her trip to Boston for a refit, and it was a only by a huge effort of the engine room staff that she could manage her current speed.
Bismarck Crippled
The one real chance of slowing Bismarck lay with the carrier Ark Royal, which had sailed north from Gibraltar with Force 'H' and was about to make an airstrike against the enemy before dark.
The conditions were not favourable for carrier operations with Ark Royal's deck pitching between 53 and 56-feet. The carrier's bow was at times buried in the sea, despite her deck being 62-feet above the waterline. The chances for success were not helped by the first air-strike mistaking Sheffield for Bismarck, only three of the fifteen aircraft recognising the mistake and did not attack. Sheffield avoided the torpedoes, of which six exploded prematurely. On the return they were warned by radio of the presence of Sheffield.
The aircraft returned to Ark Royal and rearmed, this time with contact rather than magnetic firing pistols, as they had proved to be faulty. The aircrew, this time aware of the presence of Sheffield prepared for the second attack.
In the meanwhile U-556 found herself in a near perfect position to attack Ark Royal and Renown, which had no destroyer escort and not zig-zagging. Unluckily for her captain Herbert "Parisfal" Wohlfarth he had used all his torpedoes on the convoy HX126. All he could do was watch them sail by, with the fateful Swordfish lined up on Ark Royal's deck.
The attack was carried out by fifteen Swordfish aircraft at about 21.00 hours, and two torpedo hits were scored. One struck amidships, causing no serious damage, but the second struck aft and jammed Bismarck's rudders at fifteen degrees to port. Baron Burkard Von Müllenheim-Rechberg in his book Battleship Bismarck : a survivor's story says that the rudder was jammed at twelve degrees, as he was the gu~nery officer in the after fire control position he was able to see the rudder repeater. Whether it was fifteen or twelve degrees Bismarck's fate was sealed. Earlier on exercises she had proved almost impossible to maneuver by propellers alone. This was due to the convergent design of her propellers, now in the Atlantic with high seas and wind all she could do was head into the wind. Various engine speeds and combinations where tried without success, no matter what was tried she would head into the wi~d, back towards the advancing British forces.
At 21.36 hours, the cruiser Sheffield, shadowing Bismarck, signaled "Bismarck changing course 340 degrees NNW". This news was received with skepticism by the CommanderinChief, for such a course would bring the enemy directly towards his flagship. Nevertheless, at 21.42 hours, he altered course to south and steered towards Bismarck's reported position. Soon afterwards, a signal was received from Ark Royal stating that the aircrews from the last strike were claiming at least two hits. Then came a report from a flying boat, saying that the enemy was steering a northerly course, confirming Sheffield's earlier message. Bismarck, now un-manoeuvrable, could not escape and would soon be within range of the guns of King George V and Rodney. Admiral Tovey did not wish to engage in a night action, however, and reduced speed until dawn, when the final approach would be made.
Destroyer Attack
Throughout the night Bismarck’s was harassed by destroyers of the Sixth and Fourth Destroyer Flotilla.
The destroyers, Cossack, Zulu, Sikh, Maori, Piorun under the command of Captain(D) Phillip Vian. The destroyers had been ordered on Sunday 25th to leave the convoy WS8B which they had been escorting and for Cossack, Zulu, Sikh to join Tovey in King George V and for Maori, Piorun to join Rodney. The ships formed up line abreast and at 27knots left the convoy. When on the 26th Bismarck was sighted Vian decided that his duty was to intercept her and without waiting for Admiralty orders set off in pursuit.
Although they claimed to have hit Bismarck's with torpedoes and Bismarck’s claimed to have sunk several destroyers, both sides did no damage to each other. However for the crew of Bismarck it was not a restful night.
A Gallant Fight
Early on the morning of 27th May, King George V and Rodney began to work up speed and headed towards Bismarck's position from the westnorthwest. A Force 6 wind was blowing from the northwest, there was a rough sea with a heavy swell from the northwest and the sky was overcast. Visibility was good. Admiral Tovey had decided to approach from the west in order to have the advantage of the conditions of light and the direction of the swell, which would be particularly important during the endon approach. It was important also, that the British ships should not get to leeward of Bismarck, as she might then use a smokescreen to delay her destruction. Considerations of fuel, Uboat and air attack, moreover, made an early a~d close action essential. The approach from the west, however, made it very difficult to avoid the effects of smoke interference.
At 07.08 hours, Admiral Tovey ordered Rodney to assume open order from the flagship, that is. To say, she was given permission to maneuver independently some distance from King George V at 08.20 hours, Norfolk was sighted and she reported Bismarck's exact position, which allowed the British battleships to make some final course adjustments. The enemy was sighted by the airdefence officer of Rodney, at 08.43 hours, bearing 115 degrees just off the starboard bow, at a range of about 25,000 yards and steering directly towards the British ships. Rodney and King George V were steering 110 degrees in line abreast, about 1,600 yards apart.
At 08.47 hours, Rodney opened fire with 'A' and 'B' turrets at a range of 23,400 yards, and King George V opened fire one minute later. Bismarck chose Rodney as her target, and opened fire will all four guns of her forward turrets at 08.49 hours. The enemy's first salvo was 1,000 yards short, the second, at 08.50 hours, straddled, one shell falling short and the remainder, over; the nearest was twenty yards away, just abaft the bridge. Bismarck's next salvo fell over, and this was followed by one short and then several overs. Rodney was maneuvering to avoid the enemy salvoes, apparently with success.
Rodney straddled Bismarck with her third and fourth salvoes and scored a hit with the former at 08.50 hours. At 08.57 hours, she scored another hit which penetrated the forecastle and put Bismarck's 'Anton' turret out of action. By 09.00 hours, the enemy's rate of fire had slowed and had become erratic. At 08.59 hours, with the range down to 16,000 yards, King George V turned to starboard to bring her after turret into action and, three and a half minutes later, Rodney conformed. At 09.02 hours, a 16inch or 14inch shell penetrated Bismarck's 'Bruno' turret, detonated inside, and blew the rear plate of the gunhouse over the ship's side. At about the same time, a shell destroyed her foretop, together with the central armamentcontrol position, and killed most of the senior officers. At 09.12 hours, the forward firecontrol position was destroyed, and six minutes later, the after firecontrol position, leaving the ship without a centralised firecontrol. At 09.15 hours, Bismarck shifted the fire of her after turrets to King George V, but shifted back to Rodney five minutes later, by which time only 'Caesar' turret of the main armament was still firing.
By this time, Bismarck was drawing aft of the British ships and at 09.16 hours, Rodney turned 180 degrees to starboard, which brought her onto a northerly course, parallel with the enemy, at a range of about 9,000 yards. At 09.25 hours, King George V also turned north, bringing the range down to 12,000 yards, but at the same time, fire from the flagship slackened, for several reasons. First, the target was obscured by smoke and by Rodney's shell splashes, second, her gunnery radar set had temporarily broken down, and third, she had suffered several mechanical breakdowns in her 14inch turrets, one of which was out of action for half an hour. Meanwhile, Rodney had altered course to starboard, to cross ahead of Bismarck's course, and for the next thirty minutes, passed back and forth across the enemy's bow, firing at ranges between 4,000 and 3,000 yards. By 09.40 hours, Bismarck was silent, her main and secondary armaments having been put out of action.
At 10.05 hours, King George V closed Bismarck and fired several salvoes at 3,000 yards range, into what was now a floating hulk.
The fuel situation of the battleships had now become critical, and at 10.15 hours, Admiral Tovey ordered King George V and Rodney to break off the action and steer 027 degrees for home. Rodney fired her last salvo at 10.14 hours and King George V, at 10.22.
Bismarck, her flag still flying, was very low in the water and on fire, but she showed no signs of sinking. Admiral Tovey ordered any ships in the area that still had torpedoes, to close, and sink her at 10.25 hours, the cruiser Dortsetshire fired two torpedoes into her starboard side, and these exploded below the bridge. At 10.36 hours, she fired another torpedo into her port side, and Bismarck heeled to port and began sinking by the stern. At 10.40 hours, she capsized and sank.
(References:
Alan Raven and John Roberts, British Battleships of World War II, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1976
Ludovic Kennedy, Pursuit The Chase and Sinking of the Bismarck, Viking Press, New York, 1974
U-boat Net, The U-Boat War 1939-1945
Baron Burkard Von Müllenheim-Rechberg ;
translated by Jack Sweetman, Battleship Bismarck : a survivor's story, Bodley
Head, London, 1981 )
INCROCIATORE DA BATTAGLIA H.M.S. HOOD / BATTLECRUISER HMS HOOD
NAVI DA GUERRA / WARSHIPS AND BATTLESHIPS
