THE HUNTING OF THE BISMARCK
OPERATION RHEINUBUNG
HISTORY OF THE BATTLE:
THE PREPARATIONS OF THE BATTLE
(Drawn from: "Great German battle ships of the Second World war" of M.J. Whitley, 1989)
The Bismarck had been prepared for a new mission in the northern Atlantic, where the Kriegsmarine was free to assemble all of it efforts after the renouncement to the operation Seelowe (the invasion of the lnghilterra) October 14 th 1940.
The attacks on these routs, initiated with the consignment of the AdmiraI Graf Spee and the Deutschland ne11939, had been interrupted first from the invasion of Norway (Operation Weseriibung) and then from the projects of invasion of the lnghilterra.
Now, with the fall of France, you/they could fully be exploited for the unities of surface and not only for the U-boats the acquired bases on the Atlantic coast.
To the light of the consignments of the Admiral Scheer, of the Scharnhorst, of the Gneisenau and even those of the Hipper, that held some great successes, on April 2 Raeder communicated the directives for the "future operations of the strengths of surface" (B. n° 1 SKL1 Op410/41), in which underlined the strategic and tactical results gotten with the consignments of which above and it wished a peer upsetting of the hostile strengths in the Mediterranean and in the territorial waters.
The principal objective they were as always the commercial routs of the Atlantic north, even if the English, aware of the German aims, had succeeded already in effectively defending himself/herself/themselves during the operation Berlin making to escort every convoy from a battleship. To put in sea more ships pirate meant to subsequently hock the English, forcing them to remove some unities from the Mediterranean, with great benefit for the strengths of the Axle.
In this phase of the war the Royal Navy had 4 battleships of the class R (Revenge, Resolution, Royal Sovereign and Ramilles), 5 of the class Queen Elizabeth (Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Warspite, Malaya and Barham), all armed with guns from 15 thumbs, besides the Rodney and to the Nelson and 3 battle cruisers (Hood, Repulse and Renown) armed with the same caliber.
Of the new unities armed with guns from 14 pollici,las King George Vera already on call and the Prince of Wales would have been ready to days.
The Royal Navy boasted therefore a total of 16 battleships, but only on the paper, because Malaya and Resolution were in reparation after 10 clash with the torpedos of the U106 and the French submersible Beveziers.
The Queen Elizabeth were almost all appropriated in the Mediterranean, therefore Great Britain would not have been able to increase the number of convoy escorted by battleships or heavy cruisers without considerably notching the Fleet of the Mediterranean and Raeder it contemplated really to disperse the hostile strengths for then to attach the open weak points. Both the parts knew that the things were in these terms, less clear it was the type of attack that would have been able sferrare Raeder.
However admiral made its plans confiding to have two unities of the type Bismarck to attach the convoy; one with the assignment to sink the escort while the other dealt him with the merchantmen.
Unfortunately however, it was unlikely that the Tirpitz was ready in time, so much more than Raeder didn't intend certain to reduce the times of training for the Captain of vessel
Topp and for his/her crew. You studied therefore an intermediary solution, with the Bismarck been suitable to the battleships of escort and the Prinz Eugen to attach the convoy.
L 'admiral didn't have alternatives, all the battleships were trapped to Brest, except the slow Panzerschiffs and the light cruisers, while the Admiral Hipper needed some reparations after the last one gotten in Atlantic.
The Prinz Eugen had the advantage to be fast and to have a lilt of fast draught, ideal against the merchantmen, besides a big plant lanciasiluri that the Bismarck missed it instead. Of other song however, despite the resumption, its motors were not reliable of it economic, for which for the restocking of fuel was needed of it.
Raeder also had another motive to want to start the operation without attending the Tirpitz: USA were still neutral to this point, but if the things were changed in expectancy you/he/she would not have been more possible to make to pass some ship in ocean.
In origin the operation foresaw the departure from Germany of a war team driven by the Bismarck, while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be set sail by Brest to destroy the most greater possible number of convoy.
Then the Scharnhorst accused instead some unexpected problems that held her/it in the yard for quite a lot months, therefore been decided that the Gneisenau had to depart alone for uniting himself/herself/themselves to the team of the Bismarck, possibly after some raid between the islands of Green Head and the Azzorres.
This second floor was still fresh when the Gneisenau was seriously struck from a torpedo and despite the repeated supplications of the officer of commands of the Tirpitz, in the plans of the operation the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen remained only.
Contrarily to you get her precedents, this time he allowed the attack the escorted convoy, but the Bismarck had the order to hock the enemy without destroying him/it and avoiding to be struck, so that the cruiser you/he/she could attach the convoy.
You confirmed that the primary objective was the destruction of the hostile merchant traffic and that the military unities could be attached only when it revealed him necessary to reach the primary purpose and if it didn't behave risks.
L 'assigned operational area was the northern Atlantic, to north of the equator and out of the waters of the neutral states, while that of the U-boats was to north of 47°30' along the whole block of the British islands, to 42°N south and to east of the 3000.
It would have intervened you both the German submersibles that those Italian and he didn't intend to separate the operational zones of the unities of surface; both strengths would have profited of this collaboration since the Kriegsmarine was revealed badly informed on the routs and on the real times of transit of the convoy.
The ships would have made reference to the command to earth of the GROUP Nord up to the crossing of the line between the south point of Iceland and the Ebridis, after that the GROUP Ovest in Paris would have taken over.
After the operation Berlin was clear the importance of the recognition and the information on the convoy.
The deciphering of the messages radio allied it was of primary importance, but it was also had to widen the ray of the recognitions to patrol the routs on which the convoy were anticipated. To this purpose the squadron received not less than 7 hydroplanes Ar 196, even if the preceding operations had shown the drawbacks of the catapult hydroplanes, that could not often be used in full ocean, where the conditions of the time it was - no seldom ideal, and that they forced the ships to compromise too much himself/herself/themselves for recuperarli.
To every way the Kriegsmarine didn't have other choice, considering that it only aircraft carrier, the Graf Zeppe/in, inultimata lay. Always on the escort of the operation Berlin was decided to introduce of the "ships scout" (Spaschiffe) that they had to set him part of the job of patrol of the "Rheiniibung" (1 SKL I the 6662 G. Kdos, 4.4.41).
The choice fell around two motor ships Gonzenheim and Kota Penang, that received equipments and restocking for 4 months of trip, after you are been modified for entertaining the crews to which to submit the captured ships and up to 300 prisoners. The Gonzenheim set sail from Stettino 1'11 April for the yards Wilton Werft of Schiedam, in Holland, while his/her sister was modified according to the plans by P. Smit to Rotterdam.
I works you/they had to be completes within April 26 and, gives the importance of the operation, the expiration was too brought closer. To avoid problems of discipline, the two merchantmen that sailed under the flag of the Reichsdianst twos officers of the Gneisenau were entrusted.
For the restocking in sea you/they were detached two tanker instead {Trossschiffe): the Ermand with 9.366 m3s of fuel and the Spichern, that it transported 8.000 m3s of fuel for the turbines and almost 3.000 for the diesel ones.
The first one owed stazionare in the square DR16 (900 mms. to I Know about the Azzorres) and the second, that had to also supply the U-boats, in the CD64 (400 mns to Or of the Azzorres). Then they took the sea other 5 unities of escort (Begleittankschiffe): the Bechen, waited for to south of Head Farewell (AJ26), the Lothringen, to east of the Bechen in the narrow one of Davis, the It Hamburg, 390 mns to I Know about the Azzorres (CD32), the Breme, 600 mns ace of the Azzorres (DF96) and the Weissenburg in the Arctic one. There were finally the Heide, as it reserves for the Weissenburg and the Woin to supply the team in Norway.
Resolved the problem of the restocking, I'SKL dealt him with the precision of the meteorological forecasts. The bad time with fog or scarce visibility was an essential requisite or desirable quantomeno, to elude patrols her/it northern of the Royal Navy.
In reality we will see more ahead that the technology radar English was evolved as a lot not it read to believe the Kriegsmarine, but also so the bad time was not able whether to facilitate the transit of the German ships in the narrow one of Denmark. Already to the beginning of March, for the reentry of the - the Scheer and of the Admira / Hipper from the respective missions in ocean, I'SKL had sent some ships of the meteorological service in the narrow one to verify the conditions of the time and the bench of ice. They were information of vital importance, since the width of the narrow one, and therefore the space (manoeuvre and of escape of the hostile pattuglies, it was I conditioned from the extension of the frozen surface.
This assignment was submitted for a long time ray to the airplanes Focke-Wulf Fw2C Condor of the Fliegerfiirer Atlantik that you/they could not often take off for the bad time and that however they were I conditioned from the bad relationships between harbor and aeronautics.
The commander of the GROUP Nord, Admiral Carls otherwise thought her/it; he didn't want to put in danger the unities of the meteorological service and you/he/she feared that their presence could make to understand to the English that the ships pirate they were on the street of the return, therefore churches 10 appropriation of an U-boat of the base d Stavanger and it supported for the future the use of the ex you submerge Dutch biles UD1-UD5.
Its proposals were rejected and 16 March the ex fishing-boat Sachsen (284 tonns) it set sail d Trondheim to go himself/herself/themselves to 300 east mn of the peninsula of Langanes, while the Coburg (344 tonns.) he/she waited for him in the narrow one of Davis I widen of Resolution between Canada and Greenland. The Sachsen transmitted his/her first relationship to the GROUP Nord on March 2, after that you/he/she was sent to notice the Coburg, attravel sando the narrow one of Denmark. Other relationships on the conditions of the ice were transmitted by the airplanes of the I/KG 40 ds Trondheim il27 March and from the Coburg to the reentry in Germany.
These small unities, forced to work alone for long periods under environment conditions and human particularly difficult, they deserve a particular mention. You/they were constantly threatened by the English, that intercepted their messages radio and they tried to take her in trap, aware than their role was important. L' Hohmann took over to the Sachsen in Iceland, for then to surrender the place to the Ostmark, set sail by Trond heim on April 2, for which to the throwing of the operation Rheinibungs had to be in alone sea the Sachsen and the Ostmark. The only other unity of surface in arctic waters was 10 Schiffs (the ex British fishing-boat Bradman captured to Aandalsru in April 1940), party in solitary for a north mission.
The meteorological service transferred the new unity Laueburg from Kiel to Trondheim with the order to replace the Sachsen within the end of May, while the Ostmark would have been I noticed from the Munchen to the beginning of the month.
These movements of survey of the meteorological service were not only of great importance to the goals of the operation Rheinubung, but above all for as you/they were exploited then by the Royal Navy against the same Kriegsmarine. The English were by now I realized that these unarmed ships were easy preys and that attaching her of surprise precious information you/they would be conquered on the codes on the German equipments.
The first one to fall was the Munchel intercepted by a team of cruisers and destroyer on May 7 to south of Jan Mayen.
The men of the destroyer Somalia they boarded her/it and they took possession him some data related to the system of decoding "Enigma" before sinking it. This and other attacks of the same type allowed the English to sensitively improve the deciphering of the messages the code hostile, despite the dark points that sol were clarified after the operation Rheinubung.