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The Hijackings: A Pilot's View(Per raggiungere l'articolo originale clicca sul titolo qui sopra)
Don Radlauer 13/09/2001
In order to try to unravel the events leading up to Tuesday's catastrophic terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC, we give here a summary of the flight paths of the four doomed flights. The analysis is by a pilot who has accumulated many hours of flight over the Eastern United States.
Flight SummariesUnited Airlines Flight 175 Note that Flight 175's legitimate pilots must have been in control until about the time the plane crossed the northern New Jersey border; up to this time the plane had followed its planned route, including turns that the hijackers would not have had the navigational skills to make (and which were not essential in order to fulfill their mission). Also, note that the hijack did not occur until a point at which a passenger on the left side of the plane would have had a clear view of the Twin Towers. From this point on, it was easy to navigate the airplane by this obvious landmark – and target. The hijackers of this flight clearly knew that its route would take it within about 50 miles of Manhattan – close enough to use the Twin Towers as a visual landmark. Thus, they could sit back and wait until they had a clear view of their target. One obvious conclusion is that the hijackers had taken the flight before and knew the visual characteristics of the flight path. American Airlines Flight 11 The planned route of this flight would bypass Lower Manhattan at a distance of at least 100 miles; in even slightly hazy conditions the hijackers knew that they couldn't count on a view of their target. Instead, they planned in advance to use the Hudson River as their landmark and fly right down its valley to their target. As this valley is easy to find and follow, the hijackers didn't need to keep the legitimate pilots around beyond the climbout period – and thus they took control of the plane at an earlier stage than the hijackers of UAL 175 did. Again, the hijackers would have needed to have taken this
flight before, since familiarity with the route normally taken would be
essential in order to know when to take control of the plane and how to
find their target. The Hudson River Valley is an obvious landmark,
requiring no particular navigational skills to find and follow towards New
York City. This is probably one reason why the hijackers apparently took
control of Flight 11 much earlier than was the case with UAL 175 – there
was no significant risk of getting lost without a “real” pilot. I
would hazard a guess that the take-over occurred fairly soon after takeoff,
shortly before the point were the plane began to drift northward from its
planned route. The minor deviation would not have been of any concern to
the hijackers; they knew that they had only to continue in a generally
westerly direction and they would pass over the Hudson River valley. United Airlines Flight 93 The route this flight took after it turned away from Cleveland strongly suggests that its hijackers were intending to attack a target in or near Washington, D.C. There is convincing evidence that there was a struggle between the hijackers and a small group of passengers (and possibly crew). This may account for some of the erratic flying that was reported, as well as the plane's eventual crash in an area well clear of anything that might have been the hijackers' intended target. Had this plane been flown successfully to Washington, D.C., it would have arrived there at around 10:30. Assuming this hijacking was planned as meticulously as the ones directed at New York targets, the hijackers were presumably using Cleveland and/or the shore of Lake Erie as their indicator that it was time to make their move. American Airlines Flight 77 A pilot on the ground was quoted as saying that the plane
was in a power-dive when it hit the ground. In other words, the
hijacker-pilot had spotted his target and was accelerating toward it. In
the case of a plane of this size, it is a great deal easier to navigate a
plane straight and level into a tall building, as happened at the World
Trade Center, than it is to crash precisely into a target close to the
ground. The hijacker guiding AL 77 was more than likely intending to bring
the plane down onto the Pentagon itself, which would have resulted in far
greater devastation. There has been some speculation in the media that the
Pentagon was not the intended target of this plane. From the air, the
Pentagon is a very visible landmark, which the hijackers could be certain
of finding and targeting quite easily. Given the ease of targeting the
Pentagon and its role as the center of the United States military, I
don’t think there is any reason to assume that it was not the target. If
the plane was indeed accelerating as it hit, this would tend to support
the contention that the Pentagon was the intended target. General ConclusionsAll the hijacked flights took off within a twelve-minute span, and all were fully fueled for a transcontinental flight. Clearly the terrorists carefully selected a set of flights that met these two requirements. It is also clear that, at least in the case of the two flights targeted at New York, the hijackers must have taken the same flights at least once before, in order to familiarize themselves with the routes that would be taken and the landmarks they would use to decide when to attack, and to navigate towards their target. In the case of UAL 175, at least one of the hijackers was probably sitting on the left side of the plane to act as a "spotter"; when s/he got a clear view of the Twin Towers, it was time to take over the airplane. Thus a study of previous flight manifests would be
advisable; it is likely that at least some of the hijackers’ names –
assuming that they had registered under their own names – appear as
passengers on the same flights on previous dates. It is also likely that
some of the hijackers will be found to have been among the passengers
sitting on the left-hand, southward facing, side of United Flight 175.
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Questa pagina è stata aggiornata domenica 23 marzo 2003. © 2002-2003 MaC. Tutti i diritti riservati.
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