Indonesia : visione di crisi

by: http://www.feer.com

THE FAREWELL DINNER for departing Australian Ambassador Richard Smith was just breaking up when his cellphone rang. It was late evening on October 12, and as his white-faced staff gathered around Smith in a corner of his New Zealand counterpart's sitting room, they heard the first reports of the devastating car-bomb explosions on the island of Bali that had killed more than 180 people, many of them Australian tourists.

Within 24 hours, 50 Australian police and intelligence specialists were on the scene. They were quickly joined by agents of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and British Scotland Yard detectives. The speed at which the Indonesians gave the go-ahead for foreign investigators to begin probing the bomb attacks reflected a disturbing array of shortcomings, which have long hindered the country's response to the terrorist threat that other governments had been warning it about.

Western diplomats, experienced Indonesia watchers and security analysts say the reasons why terrorism has been able to take root in the world's most populous Muslim nation run the gamut from a lack of political will and effective leadership to bureaucratic obstacles and an underpaid, poorly trained security force that has left the country with porous borders and lax law enforcement.

Only in the past six months has there been a limited effort to get a handle on the terrorist threat. Western security specialists say Indonesian intelligence agents, acting on information from their Western counterparts, have detained and handed over significantly more suspected Al Qaeda members than the three that have been disclosed. This strongly indicates that there are more of these non-Indonesian militants around.

But it was only the Bali bombings that appear to have convinced the Indonesians to go after their own home-grown militants.

Hampered by a fractious debate over a long-delayed anti-terrorism law, which brings civil libertarians and radicals together in an unlikely alliance, Indonesia's President Megawati Sukarnoputri is expected to be given emergency powers in days that will allow authorities to arrest anyone suspected of terrorist activities.

The lack of empowering legislation to provide a legal and political cover has been an enduring problem for security agencies, which under former President Suharto's 1965-98 rule didn't need to bother with such niceties. In a new democratic environment, police have had to rely on a criminal code, with its onerous rules of evidence, to tackle terror suspects--and then had to deal with the political-will issue on top of that.

A lack of professionalism is a major obstacle as well. "This is a chronic problem of the police and the military," says Harold Crouch, one of Australia's foremost experts on Indonesian security affairs. "The police don't have computers, they don't have proper communications equipment, they don't even have phones. How can they compete with a sophisticated terrorist network?"

Indonesia's inability to tackle the terrorist threat to date means the impact of the bombing will go beyond the immediate ripples that hit regional markets and currencies. Countries around the region could suffer.

To begin with, the impact on Indonesia's economy will be substantial. The devastating short-term impact on the country's important tourism industry is clear. Annual revenues are worth more than $5 billion, which could translate into a contribution to GDP this year of some 2%-3%.

Also obvious is that the Bali tragedy will deter foreign investors. One Western security consultant says he is now reluctantly advising his business clients to reconsider their presence.

Because of the expected drop in tourism and foreign investment, the Indonesian government said on October 15 it would likely miss its budget targets for this year. The International Monetary Fund then announced that it would need to revise some of its policy targets under its $5 billion lending programme for Indonesia because of the attack.

But analysts also fear a longer-term impact on business confidence in the region that could, in the words of a report issued by Morgan Stanley in Singapore, "further derail the timid economic revival Southeast Asia has enjoyed since the 1997-98 Asian crisis."

Strong words, but its neighbours know from experience that problems in Indonesia mean problems for them. Political turmoil in the sprawling archipelago during the past five years inflicted currency volatility and negative market sentiment on the rest of Southeast Asia.

Add to this now the fear that any crackdown by Jakarta could stoke support for Islamic militancy in states like Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, for all of which tourism is an important source of revenue.

Meanwhile the exodus of foreigners from Indonesia is only just beginning. The U.S. embassy ordered nonessential staff and all dependents to leave and advised other American citizens to consider doing the same.

Says a Jakarta-based Western security consultant: "All the well-informed embassies are saying the same thing: The situation is bad and no matter what the government does, it won't be enough and it doesn't have the competency or willingness to solve the problem."

But the really bad news is that the government is in a poor position to fix this problem. Crouch says the Indonesians are working with "blunt tools" that time and again have failed to turn up the evidence to convict, but which over the next few weeks will determine whether the government can develop a credible assessment of the current terrorist threat. He is not hopeful for the future either: "Law enforcement is simply not capable. If the political will is weak, it's because the police can't do the job."

That said, sources close to Indonesian intelligence confirm that they are looking for seven suspects--two Arabs and five Indonesians thought to be connected to the regionally based Jemaah Islamiah Islamic movement, which Australia believes was responsible for the blasts with Al Qaeda help. Indonesian special forces agents are also believed to have penetrated Jemaah Islamiah.

The Bali bombing was sad vindication for former U.S. Ambassador Robert Gelbard, who was rebuffed three years ago when he tried to brief Indonesian officials on the looming terrorist threat. "We had proof we were under surveillance from a hit team," he recalls. "Instead of cooperating, they vilified us."

It was the interrogation of Iraqi-born Al Qaeda operative Omar Al Faruq that cemented suspicions among U.S. intelligence agencies about the extent of the relationship between Osama bin Laden's network and the Jemaah Islamiah, which is believed by Asian and Western intelligence agencies to have been behind a series of bombings in Malaysia and Indonesia over the past two years.

And now the blood-letting on a balmy Saturday night in Indonesia's most popular tourist destination has finally galvanized Megawati into confronting the problem. Close aide Pramono Anung told the REVIEW: "She realises this is the time when she will have to be pro-active."

In the past few months, the government has quietly placed a restraining hand on some of Indonesia's more violent Muslim groups. Jafar Umar Thalib, leader of the Laskar Jihad Islamic militia, is facing trial for inciting unrest between Muslims and Christians on the island of Ambon. And members of the Islamic Defenders Front were recently taken into custody for damaging public property in raids on nightclubs and other entertainment centres.

In a further development, hundreds of Laskar Jihad militants sailed out of Ambon two days after the Bali attacks, ostensibly on the grounds that funds had run out. Thalib's lawyer says their departure heralds the disbandment of the group.

Washington's main target, Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, alleged leader of the Jemaah Islamiah, remains free and defiant, claiming at a press conference after the bombing that it was the work of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. This was an allegation later echoed by Husni Thamrin , deputy chairman of Vice-President Hamzah Haz's Muslim-orientated United Development Party, whose leaders have provided Bashir with political cover.

Up to now, arresting Bashir has been considered too risky and counter-productive unless the government had the evidence to convict him of a crime. It would also undermine Indonesia's pretensions as a budding democratic nation. Even Western intelligence specialists acknowledge the difficulty of putting a glove on the wily firebrand, who is widely believed to have built up an extremist network while living in exile in Malaysia during the past 15 years.

But if Megawati arms herself with emergency powers, that view may change. Security analysts say Bashir's arrest may not lead to massive street violence, but they are worried about some of his more radical supporters and their threats to carry out suicide bombings or other acts of terrorism.

Azymardi Azra, rector of the Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University, says Megawati must seize the initiative and rally moderate Muslim groups around her. Convincing them will be key to the success of government efforts to crack down on elements with suspected links to terrorism.

"They are willing to help," says Azyumardi, "but the government hasn't really reached out to them." It also hasn't done enough to break down the idea that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam--a suspicion fuelled by what is perceived to be blind U.S. support for Israel against the Palestinians.

Meanwhile, there are worries about internal security over the longer term. The country's local autonomy laws have eroded centralized military control. "The military is losing control over its territorial units, which believe the only thing that's important is their commercial enterprises," says a Western expert who has studied the problem.

Army chief of staff Gen. Ryamizard Riyacadu has been in Central and East Java recently talking to his soldiers and trying to address an issue that has taken on increasing gravity over the past three years. Last month, in a graphic illustration of how much the situation has deteriorated, eight policemen were killed in a battle with members of an army airborne battalion in North Sumatra over control of the marijuana trade.

Analysts are critical of the fact that the Americans appear to be more concerned about developing contacts they can call on, than on making any serious effort to push reform in the Indonesian military. "These days it just doesn't help if you have Ryamizard or [armed forces commander Gen. Endriartono] Sutarto on your side," says the Western expert, pointing to the growing collusion between district commanders and local power-holders. "What you have is simply an army for hire."