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Myths & Facts Online
The War of 1948
By Mitchell G. Bard
“The
Jews started the first war with the Arabs.”
“The Bernadotte
Plan was a viable alternative to partition.”
“The United States
was the only nation that criticized the Arab attack on Israel.”
“The West's support
of Israel allowed the Jews to conquer Palestine.”
“The Arab economic
boycott of Israel was imposed after the 1948 war.”
“The Jews started the first war with the Arabs.”
FACT
Violence in the Holy Land broke out almost immediately after the UN announced partition on November 29, 1947. Jamal Husseini, the Arab Higher Committee's spokesman, had told the UN prior to the partition vote the Arabs would drench "the soil of our beloved country with the last drop of our blood . . . ."1
Husseini's prediction began to come true after the UN announcement. The Arabs declared a protest strike and instigated riots that claimed the lives of 62 Jews and 32 Arabs. By the end of the second week, 93 Arabs, 84 Jews and 7 Englishmen had been killed and scores injured. From November 30-February 1,427 Arabs, 381 Jews and 46 British were killed and 1,035 Arabs, 725 Jews and 135 British were wounded. In March alone, 271 Jews and 257 Arabs died in Arab attacks and Jewish counterattacks.2
The chairman of the Arab Higher Committee said the Arabs would "fight for every inch of their country."3 Two days later, the holy men of Al-Azhar University in Cairo called on the Muslim world to proclaim a jihad (holy war) against the Jews.4
The first large-scale assaults began on January 9, 1948, when approximately 1,000 Arabs attacked Jewish communities in northern Palestine. By February, the British said so many Arabs had infiltrated they lacked the forces to run them back.5 In fact, the British turned over bases and arms to Arab irregulars and the Arab Legion.
In the first phase of the war, lasting from November 29, 1947 until April 1, 1948, the Palestinian Arabs took the offensive, with help from volunteers from neighboring countries. The Jews suffered severe casualties and passage along most of their major roadways was disrupted.
On April 26, 1948, Transjordan's King Abdullah said:
[A]ll our efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem have failed. The only way left for us is war. I will have the pleasure and honor to save Palestine.6
On May 4, 1948, the Arab Legion attacked Kfar Etzion. The defenders drove them back, but the Legion returned a week later. After two days, the ill-equipped and outnumbered settlers were overwhelmed. Many defenders were massacred after they had surrendered.7 This was prior to the invasion by the regular Arab armies that followed Israel's declaration of independence.
The UN blamed the Arabs for the violence. The UN Palestine Commission was never permitted by the Arabs or British to go to Palestine to implement the resolution. On February 16, 1948, the Commission reported to the Security Council:
Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein.8
The Arabs were blunt in taking responsibility for starting the war. Jamal Husseini told the Security Council on April 16, 1948:
The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight.9
The British commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb admitted:
Early in January, the first detachments of the Arab Liberation Army began to infiltrate into Palestine from Syria. Some came through Jordan and even through Amman . . . They were in reality to strike the first blow in the ruin of the Arabs of Palestine.10
Despite the disadvantages in numbers, organization and weapons, the Jews began to take the initiative in the weeks from April 1 until the declaration of independence on May 14. The Haganah captured several major towns including Tiberias and Haifa, and temporarily opened the road to Jerusalem.
The partition resolution was never suspended or rescinded. Thus, Israel, the Jewish State in Palestine, was born on May 14, as the British finally left the country. Five Arab armies (Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq) immediately invaded Israel. Their intentions were declared by Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League: "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades."11
“The Bernadotte Plan was a viable alternative to partition.”
FACT
During the summer of 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte was sent by the UN to Palestine to mediate a truce and try to negotiate a settlement. Bernadotte's plan called for the Jewish State to relinquish the Negev and Jerusalem to Transjordan and to receive the western Galilee. This was similar to the boundaries that had been proposed prior to the partition vote, and had been rejected by all sides. Now, the proposal was being offered after the Arabs had gone to war to prevent partition and a Jewish state had been declared. The Jews and Arabs both rejected the plan.
Ironically, Bernadotte found little enthusiasm among the Arabs for independence. He wrote in his diary:
The Palestinian Arabs had at present no will of their own. Neither have they ever developed any specifically Palestinian nationalism. The demand for a separate Arab state in Palestine is consequently relatively weak. It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated in Transjordan.12
The failure of the Bernadotte scheme came as the Jews began to have greater success in repelling the invading Arab forces and expanding control over territory outside the partition boundaries.
“The United States was the only nation that criticized the Arab attack on Israel.”
FACT
The United States, the Soviet Union and most other states immediately recognized Israel after it declared independence on May 14, 1948, and indicted the Arabs for their aggression. The United States urged a resolution charging the Arabs with breach of the peace.
Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko told the Security Council, May 29, 1948:
This is not the first time that the Arab states, which organized the invasion of Palestine, have ignored a decision of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. The USSR delegation deems it essential that the council should state its opinion more clearly and more firmly with regard to this attitude of the Arab states toward decisions of the Security Council.13
The initial phase of the fighting ended after the Security Council threatened July 15 to cite the Arab governments for aggression under the Charter. By this time, the Haganah had been renamed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and succeeded in stopping the Arab offensive.
Military Situation On Effective
Date of Cease-Fire
(June 11, 1948)
|
“The West's support of Israel allowed the Jews to conquer Palestine.”
FACT
The Jews won their war of independence with minimal help from the West. In fact, they won despite efforts to undermine their military strength.
Although the United States vigorously supported the partition resolution, the State Department did not want to provide the Jews with the means to defend themselves. "Otherwise," Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett argued, "the Arabs might use arms of U.S. origin against Jews, or Jews might use them against Arabs."14 Consequently, on December 5, 1947, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on the region.
Many in the State Department saw the embargo as yet another means of obstructing partition. President Truman nevertheless went along with it hoping it would be a means of averting bloodshed. This was naive given Britain's rejection of Lovett's request to suspend weapons shipments to the Arabs and subsequent agreements to provide additional arms to Iraq and Transjordan.15
The Arabs had no difficulty obtaining all the arms they needed. In fact, Jordan's Arab Legion was armed and trained by the British, and led by a British officer. At the end of 1948 and beginning of 1949, British RAF planes flew with Egyptian squadrons over the Israel-Egypt border. On January 7, 1949, Israeli planes shot down four of the British aircraft.16
The Jews, on the other hand, were forced to smuggle weapons, principally from Czechoslovakia. When Israel declared its independence in May 1948, the army did not have a single cannon or tank. Its air force consisted of nine obsolete planes. Although the Haganah had 60,000 trained fighters, only 18,900 were fully mobilized, armed and prepared for war.17 On the eve of the war, chief of operations Yigael Yadin told David Ben-Gurion: "The best we can tell you is that we have a 50-50 chance."18
The Arab war to destroy Israel failed. Indeed, because of their aggression, the Arabs wound up with less territory than they would have had if they had accepted partition.
The cost to Israel, however, was enormous. "Many of its most productive fields lay gutted and mined. Its citrus groves, for decades the basis of the Yishuv's [Jewish community] economy, were largely destroyed."19 Military expenditures totaled approximately $500 million. Worse yet, 6,373 Israelis were killed, nearly one percent of the Jewish population of 650,000.
Had the West enforced the partition resolution or given the Jews the capacity to defend themselves, many lives might have been saved.
The Arab countries signed armistice agreements with Israel in 1949, starting with Egypt (Feb. 24), followed by Lebanon (March 23), Jordan (April 3) and Syria (July 20). Iraq was the only country that did not sign an agreement with Israel, choosing instead to withdraw its troops and hand over its sector to Jordan's Arab Legion.
“The Arab economic boycott of Israel was imposed after the 1948 war.”
FACT
The Arab boycott was formally declared by the newly formed Arab League Council on December 2, 1945: "Jewish products and manufactured goods shall be considered undesirable to the Arab countries." All Arab "institutions, organizations, merchants, commission agents and individuals" were called upon "to refuse to deal in, distribute, or consume Zionist products or manufactured goods."20 As is evident in this declaration, the terms "Jewish" and "Zionist" were used synonymously by the Arabs. Thus, even before the establishment of Israel, the Arab states had declared an economic boycott against the Jews of Palestine.
The boycott, as it evolved after 1948, is divided into three components. The primary boycott prohibits direct trade between Israel and the Arab nations. The secondary boycott is directed at companies that do business with Israel. The tertiary boycott involves the blacklisting of firms that trade with other companies that do business with Israel.
Once on the list, it is sometimes difficult to get off, since the company or some Arab sponsor must initiate the request. A firm might be required to supply proof that it no longer has any business with Israel and/or might be asked to make investments in Arab countries equal to those made earlier in Israel. Bribery is another means of becoming "de-listed."21
The objective of the boycott has been to isolate Israel from its neighbors and the international community, and deny it trade that might be used to augment its military and economic strength. While undoubtedly isolating Israel and separating the Jewish State from its most natural markets, the boycott failed to undermine Israel's economy to the degree intended.
In 1977, Congress prohibited U.S. companies from cooperating with the Arab boycott. When President Carter signed the law, he said the "issue goes to the very heart of free trade among nations" and that it was designed to "end the divisive effects on American life of foreign boycotts aimed at Jewish members of our society."22
The Arab League threatened to take a decisive stand against the new law, which was regarded as part of "a campaign of hysterical laws and bills . . . which Israel and world Zionism are trying not only to enforce on the U.S.; but also in some countries of Western Europe."
Contrary to claims that the bill would lead to a drastic reduction in American trade with the Arab world, imports and exports increased substantially. Broader diplomatic and cultural relations also improved. Nevertheless, certain U.S. companies were blacklisted for their relations with Israel. In addition, few other nations adopted anti-boycott laws and, instead, complied with the boycott.
Israel's capacity to reach its full economic potential was hindered for decades by the actions of Great Britain, Japan and other countries that cooperated with the boycott.
On September 30, 1994, the six Gulf Cooperation Council states announced they would no longer support the secondary boycott barring trade with companies doing business with Israel. At a meeting in Taba, Egypt, February 7-8, 1995, Egyptian, American, Jordanian and Palestinian trade leaders signed a joint document — the Taba Declaration — supporting "all efforts to end the boycott of Israel."
Since the signing of peace agreements between Israel and the PLO and Jordan, the boycott has gradually crumbled. The Arab League was forced to cancel several boycott meetings called by the Syrian hosts because of opposition from countries like Kuwait, Morocco and Tunisia. The primary boycott — prohibiting direct relations between Arab countries and Israel — has slowly cracked as nations like Qatar, Oman and Morocco have begun to negotiate deals with Israel. Furthermore, few countries outside the Middle East continue to comply with the boycott. Japan, for example, has increased its trade with Israel exponentially since the peace process began. Still, the boycott remains technically in force and several countries, most notably, Saudi Arabia, continue to enforce it.
Notes
1J.C. Hurewitz, The
Struggle For Palestine, (NY: Shocken Books, 1976), p. 308.
2Facts on File Yearbook, (NY: Facts on
File, Inc., 1948), p. 231.
3New York Times, (December 1, 1947).
4Facts on File 1948, p. 48.
5Facts on File 1947, p. 231.
6Howard Sachar, A
History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 322.
7Netanel Lorch, One
Long War, (Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1976), p. 47; Ralph Patai, ed.,
Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, (NY: McGraw Hill, 1971), pp.
307308.
8Security Council Official Records, Special
Supplement, (1948), p. 20.
9Security Council Official Records, S/Agenda/58,
(April 16, 1948), p. 19.
10John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs,
(London: Staughton and Hodder, 1957), p. 79.
11Isi Leibler, The Case For Israel,
(Australia: The Globe Press, 1972), p. 15.
12Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem,
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), p. 113.
13Security Council Official Records,
SA/Agenda/77, (May 29, 1948), p. 2.
14Foreign Relations of the United States
1947, (DC: GPO, 1948), p. 1249. [Henceforth FRUS].
15Mitchell Bard, The
Water's Edge And Beyond, (NJ: Transaction Books, 1991), pp.
171175; FRUS, pp. 53739; Robert Silverberg, If I Forget Thee
O Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of Israel, (NY: William Morrow
and Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 366, 370; Shlomo Slonim, "The 1948 American
Embargo on Arms to Palestine," Political Science Quarterly,
(Fall 1979), p. 500.
16Sachar, p. 345.
17Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, O
Jerusalem!, (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 352.
18Golda Meir, My
Life, (NY: Dell, 1975), pp. 213, 222, 224.
19Sachar, p. 452.
20Terence Prittie and Walter Nelson, The
Economic War Against The Jews, (London: Corgi Books, 1977), p. 1;
Dan Chill, The
Arab Boycott of Israel, (NY: Praeger, 1976), p. 1.
21Prittie and Nelson, pp. 47-48; Sol Stern,
"On and Off the Arabs' List," The New Republic, (March 27,
1976), p. 9; Kennan Teslik, Congress,
the Executive Branch and Special Interests, (CT: Greenwood Press,
1982), p. 11.
22Bard, pp. 91-115.
See also: History
of Israel
The 1948 War
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