Myths & Facts Online

The Arms Balance

By Mitchell G. Bard

“The threat from Israel and the withdrawal of the United States' offer to build the Aswan Dam drove Egypt to seek arms from the Soviet Union in 1955. This started the Middle East arms race.”
“The Arab states have had to keep pace with an Israeli-led arms race.”
“Israel is militarily superior to its Arab neighbors in every area and has the means to maintain its qualitative edge without outside help.”
“Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War ensures that Israel will be facing only Syria in any future conflict. Other Arab involvement is of little importance.”
“The sale of U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia has reduced the need for American troops to defend the Persian Gulf. These weapons pose no threat to Israel.”
“Israel has a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East and is able to conceal it by refusing to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
“Arms control in the Middle East is impossible so long as Israel refuses to give up its nuclear weapons.”

MYTH

“The threat from Israel and the withdrawal of the United States' offer to build the Aswan Dam drove Egypt to seek arms from the Soviet Union in 1955. This started the Middle East arms race.”

FACT

In 1955, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union in anger because the United States had armed Iraq, Egypt's hated rival, and promoted the Baghdad Pact. Nasser opposed that agreement, as he did any defense alliance with the West.

Egypt began to receive Soviet Bloc arms in 1955. The United States, hoping to maintain a degree of influence in Egypt and to induce Nasser to reduce his arms acquisitions, offered to build the Aswan Dam. But Nasser increased his arms orders and spurned a U.S. peace initiative. Egypt had embarked on a policy of "neutralism," which meant that Nasser intended to get aid from both East and West if he could, while maintaining his freedom to attack the West and assist Soviet efforts to gain influence in the Arab and Afro-Asian worlds. As a result of these actions, and Nasser's increasing hostility to the West, the United States withdrew the Aswan offer. Egypt then nationalized the Suez Canal.

Immediately after Nasser made his 1955 arms deal, Israel appealed to the United States — not for a gift of arms, but for the right to purchase them. The U.S. recognized the need to maintain an arms balance, but it referred Israel to France and other European suppliers. It was not until 1962 that the United States agreed to sell Israel its first significant American system, the HAWK anti-aircraft missile.

MYTH

“The Arab states have had to keep pace with an Israeli-led arms race.”

FACT

In most cases, the reverse was true. Egypt received the Soviet IL-28 bomber in 1955. It was not until 1958 that France provided Israel with a squadron of comparable Sud Vautour twin-jet tactical bombers. In 1957, Egypt obtained MiG-17 fighter planes. Israel received the comparable Super Mystere in 1959. Egypt had submarines in 1957, Israel in 1959. After the Egyptians obtained the MiG-21, the Israelis ordered the Dassault Mirage III supersonic interceptor and fighter-bomber.

Egypt received ground-to-air missiles — the SA-2 — two years before Israel obtained HAWK missiles from the United States. Later, Washington reluctantly agreed to sell Israel Patton tanks.

Despite being supplied arms at bargain prices in exchange for cotton, and with long-term, cheap-money credits, Egypt's debt to the USSR was estimated to be $11 billion by 1977.¹ Israel had to pay much more, plus interest, for comparable weapons.

Even when the United States began selling arms to Israel in the 1960s, it maintained a policy of balance whereby similar sales were made to Arab states. In 1965, for example, the first major tank sale to Israel was matched by one to Jordan. A year later, when Israel received Skyhawks, the U.S. provided planes to Morocco and Libya, as well as additional military equipment to Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.²

It was not until 1968, when the Johnson Administration sold Israel Phantom jets, that America's arms transfer policy shifted to emphasize maintaining the Jewish State's qualitative advantage. Since then, however, the U.S. has frequently sold sophisticated arms (e.g., F-15s, AWACS and Stinger missiles) to Israel's adversaries that have eroded the Jewish State's qualitative edge.

MYTH

“Israel is militarily superior to its Arab neighbors in every area and has the means to maintain its qualitative edge without outside help.”

FACT

Israel's qualitative military edge has declined as Arab and Muslim states acquire increasingly sophisticated conventional and unconventional arms. In fact, despite its pledges to the contrary, the United States is allowing Israel's qualitative edge to dissipate. In some cases, U.S. arms transfers to the Arabs are the reason for this erosion.

Israel's standing army is smaller than those of Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Even with its reserves, Israel is outmanned by the first three. In addition, Israel is likely to have to face a combination of enemies, as it has in each of its previous wars; together, virtually any combination of likely opponents would be superior in manpower, tanks and aircraft.

During the 1990's, the Arab states and Iran imported more than $180 billion worth of the most sophisticated weapons and military infrastructure available from both the Western and Eastern blocs. They continue to spend approximately $30 billion annually on their armed forces. Several of the world's largest arms-importing countries have been Arab nations in a state of war with Israel: Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya. While Israel spends approximately $9 billion on defense, Saudi Arabia alone spends more than $20 billion.³

Beyond the security threat, this massive arms build-up also requires Israel to spend a sixth of its GNP on defense. Even this high level of spending is insufficient, however, to meet the Arab threat, as budgetary restrictions have forced Israel to make substantial cuts in its defense allocations. Arab arms sales have significantly raised the cost to Israel of maintaining its own defense, exacerbating the strain on Israel's economy.

MYTH

“Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War ensures that Israel will be facing only Syria in any future conflict. Other Arab involvement is of little importance.”

FACT

Israel has no choice but to base its defense planning on actual Arab capabilities. If history is any lesson, a future Arab-Israeli conflict will be the result of an alliance of Arab states joining, if only temporarily, to launch a strike at Israel. The Arabs have traditionally put aside their differences at times of conflict with Israel.

Even alone, Syria would pose a serious threat to Israel. Damascus received more than $2 billion from the Gulf states because of the Gulf crisis. Much of this was spent on new modern weaponry to advance Hafez Assad's quest for "strategic parity" with Israel. Today, Syria has more tanks than Israel, and nearly as many troops and aircraft. Syria has also acquired long-range missiles from North Korea and acquired biological and chemical weapons. Syria has first-strike capabilities against key Israeli installations, including air bases and troop mobilization points.

Iraq remains a long-term concern for Israel's security. Saddam still has some 2,400 tanks and 300 combat aircraft. Some of Iraq's chemical arsenal, nuclear materials, facilities and mobile ballistic missile launchers survived the Gulf War intact and went undetected by United Nations inspectors. In January 2001, an Iraqi defector told the London Sunday Telegraph that Iraq has acquired two fully operational nuclear bombs and is working to construct more.⁴ While that story was being investigated, the German Federal Intelligence Service issued a report that said Iraq could have a bomb within three years and was developing a long-range ballistic missile that could threaten Europe by 2005. The German report also indicated that Iraq is putting a great deal of effort into producing chemical weapons and may have resumed production of biological weapons.⁵

Despite its massive arsenal of Soviet-supplied weaponry, Libya until recently had only limited capability to directly attack Israel. Libya has now acquired the capacity for aerial refueling of its bombers, giving them the means to reach Israel. U.S. intelligence also discovered the construction of a second Libyan chemical plant being built underground, in addition to the now-operational Rabta facility. The latter is estimated to have produced as much as 100 tons of chemical agents. Libya is also a state sponsor of terrorism. It is responsible for the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988, which resulted in the deaths of more than 200 Americans.

Saudi Arabia continues to order weapons on a grand scale, seeking to acquire military capabilities far beyond its own defense needs. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia continued to buy large quantities of new U.S. weaponry, although Iraq, the primary threat to the Kingdom's security, had its military capability drastically reduced.

While Egypt remains formally at peace with Israel and honors its Camp David commitments, Cairo has nevertheless amassed a substantial offensive military capability in recent years. Prudent Israeli military planners have no choice but to carefully monitor Egypt's buildup, should regional events take a dramatic turn for the worse. If the present regime in Cairo should be overthrown, the prospect for continued stable relations with Israel would diminish substantially. Despite its status as a U.S. ally, Egypt has purchased Scud missiles from North Korea and is thought to possess chemical weapons. Its army, air force and navy now field a wide range of the most sophisticated Western arms, many identical to Israel's own weapons.

MYTH

“The sale of U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia has reduced the need for American troops to defend the Persian Gulf. These weapons pose no threat to Israel.”

FACT

The Saudi armed forces are structurally incapable of defending their country. They were helpless in the face of the Iraqi threat despite the Saudi acquisition of more than $50 billion in U.S. arms and military services in the decade preceding the Gulf War.⁶ If Saddam Hussein had continued his blitzkrieg into Saudi Arabia before American forces arrived in August 1990, much of the weaponry the United States sold Riyadh over the years would now be in Iraqi hands.

Even if all past U.S. arms sales to the Saudis had sailed through Congress without question or modification, it is doubtful whether the military equation on the ground, or the decision-making process in Riyadh would have been different. The Saudis' small armed forces cannot unilaterally withstand an assault by a force three to four times its size.

Administration officials frequently argue the Saudis need advanced weapons to counter threats to their security from countries as powerful as the old Soviet Union, but maintain these same weapons would pose no danger to Israel.

The U.S. cannot hand over vast quantities of aircraft and missiles to the Saudi armed forces when it cannot ensure these weapons will not be used against Israel. The "Iran scenario" — that is, the monarchy is overthrown and a more hostile regime takes control of the Saudi arsenal — cannot be ruled out either.

In past Arab-Israeli wars, the Saudis never had a modern arsenal of sufficient size to make their participation in an Arab coalition against Israel a serious concern. The Saudi buildup since the 1973 War changes this equation. The Kingdom could be pressured into offensive action against Israel by other eastern front partners precisely because of this buildup.

MYTH

“Israel has a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East and is able to conceal it by refusing to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

FACT

Israel's decision not to be bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is based largely on the grounds that the treaty has done little to stem nuclear proliferation in the region. Iraq is a signatory to the NPT, and yet was able to amass a large amount of nuclear material without the knowledge of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Israel has called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and has stated many times that it will not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Simultaneously, numerous Middle Eastern countries have been trying to build their own nonconventional capabilities.

In addition to Iraq, which is believed to possess the materials to produce a bomb, Algeria, Syria and Iran all have ongoing covert programs to develop an atomic weapon.

MYTH

“Arms control in the Middle East is impossible so long as Israel refuses to give up its nuclear weapons.”

FACT

Israel's assumed nuclear deterrent is an option of last resort, needed to offset the large imbalance in conventional arms, chemical weapons and ballistic missiles possessed by the Arab states. Israel has no incentive to unilaterally attack its neighbors with nuclear weapons whereas the Arabs — as history has shown — have both the capability and motivation to join in a war against Israel. Arms control must therefore begin with a reduction in Arab military offensive capability. Arab "arms control" proposals in essence have only called for Israel to give up nuclear arms without offering anything substantive in return.

Notes

¹Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, Eds., The Soviet Union in the Middle East, Policies and perspectives, (NY: Holmes and Meier, 1982), pp. 8, 11, 15.
²Mitchell Bard, The Water's Edge And Beyond, (NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 194-209.
^{3Adapted by Anthony Cordesman from the U.S.} Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (DC: GPO); Cordesman for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance; Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, Eds., The Middle East Military Balance, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).
⁴Jerusalem Post, (January 29, 2001).
⁵Jerusalem Post, (February 25, 2001).
⁶Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Defense Security Assistance Agency Report; World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers.
⁷Alan Dershowitz, Chutzpah, (MA: Little Brown, and Co., 1991), p. 249.

See also: Military Threats to Israel
Israel
Wars
The Military Balance in the Middle East

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