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GRAN BRETAGNA
ROYAL NAVY - GRAN FLEET
-INCROCIATORI DA BATTAGLIA - BATTLECRUISERS -
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- H.M.S. 51 HOOD -
(Mighty Hood)
HOOD BATTLECRUISER
"Ventis Secundis "
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HISTORY
HMS Hood (pennant number 51) was the last battlecruiser of the Royal Navy to be built. One of four Admiral-class battlecruisers ordered in mid-1916 under the Emergency War Programme, her design—although drastically revised after the Battle of Jutland and improved while she was under construction—still had serious limitations. For this reason, and since the German battlecruisers they were designed to counter were unlikely to be completed, work on her sister ships was suspended in 1917 leaving Hood as the only one to be constructed. She was named after the 18th-century Admiral Samuel Hood.
Hood was involved in a number of flag waving exercises between her commissioning in 1920 and the outbreak of war in 1939; these included sorties to the Mediterranean Sea and a circumnavigation of the globe with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron in 1923–24. She was refitted twice before being stationed with the Mediterranean Fleet due to the outbreak of the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. When the Spanish Civil War broke out she was officially assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet; returning to England in 1939 for an overhaul. At this point in her service, Hood's usefulness had deteriorated due to changing technology in naval armour and weaponry. While she was scheduled to undergo a major rebuild in 1941 to correct these issues, the outbreak of the Second World War resulted in her being pressed into service without the upgrades she needed.
When war with Germany was declared in September 1939, Hood was operating in the area around Iceland, protecting convoys from German attack. After a brief overhaul to her engine plant she sailed as the flagship of Force H and as such participated in the destruction of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir intended to deny it to the Germans. Relieved as flagship of Force H she was dispatched to Scapa Flow, and operated in the area as a convoy escort and later as an intercept force against a potential invasion fleet from Germany. In May 1941, she and Prince of Wales were ordered to intercept the German battleship Bismarck which was en route to attack convoys in the Atlantic. On 24 May 1941, in the Battle of the Denmark Strait, Hood was destroyed in an explosion that split the battlecruiser into two pieces. The loss of Hood had a profound effect on the British, and the resulting orders from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the Royal Navy to "sink the Bismarck" culminated in a naval battle on 26–27 May that ended in the sinking of the Bismarck.
Partly because of the manner in which Hood was lost in World War II, the battlecruiser remains a popular subject for naval history, with extensive research being done into the reasons for the loss of Hood and into the subsequent chase of Bismarck by the Royal Navy, which deployed a large number of ships in the effort to locate and sink Bismarck. The chase and the death of both Hood and Bismarck have been covered in printed media, television series, movies, and other popular culture realms, which has helped the story of both ships survive so well today.
Hood carried eight 42 calibre BL 15 inch Mark I guns. She was the only ship to carry these guns in the hydraulically powered Mark II twin turrets which were designated 'A', 'B', 'X' and 'Y' from front to rear. The gun house for this mount was larger than the previous mountings, with a flatter roof that was less vulnerable to incoming fire and allowed an extra 10° of elevation (−5 to +30°) over the original Mark I mounting.120 rounds per gun were carried.
Hood's secondary armament was a dozen 50 calibre BL 5.5-inch Mark I guns. They were shipped on shielded CP Mark II single mounts fitted along the upper deck and the forward shelter deck. This high position allowed them to be worked during heavy weather as they were less affected by waves and spray compared with the casemate mounts of earlier British capital ships. Hood carried 200 rounds apiece for them. Two of these guns on the shelter deck were temporarily replaced by QF 4 inch Mark V anti-aircraft (AA) guns between 1938 and 1939. All the 5.5 inch guns were removed during another refit in 1940.
Hood's original anti-aircraft armament consisted of four QF 4 inch Mark V guns. These were joined in early 1939 by four dual-purpose Mark XIX twin mounts for the 45 calibre QF 4 inch Mark XVI gun. The single guns were removed in mid-1939 and a further three Mark XIX mounts were added in early 1940. The Mark XIX mounting could elevate from −10 to +80°. The Mark XVI gun fired 15–20 35-pound (16 kg) high explosive shells per minute at a muzzle velocity of 2,660 ft/s (810 m/s). Against surface targets it had a range of 19,850 yards (18,150 m) and a maximum ceiling of 31,000 ft (9,400 m), but an effective anti-aircraft range of much less.
In 1931 a pair of Mark V octuple mountings for the 40-millimetre (1.6 in) QF 2 pounder Mark VIII gun were added on the shelter deck, abreast the funnels, a third Mark VI mount being added in 1937.
The Mark V and VI mounts could depress to −10° and elevate to a maximum of 80°. The Mark VIII 2-pounder gun fired a 40-millimetre (1.6 in) .91-pound (0.41 kg) shell at a muzzle velocity of 1,920 ft/s (590 m/s) to a distance of 3,800 yards (3,500 m). The gun's rate of fire was approximately 96–98 rounds per minute.
Two quadruple Mark I mountings for the 0.5 inch Vickers Mark III machine gun were added in 1933 with a further two mountings added in 1937.
These mounts could depress to −10° and elevate to a maximum of 70°. The machine guns fired a 1.326-ounce (37.6 g) bullet at a muzzle velocity of 2,520 ft/s (770 m/s). This gave the gun a maximum range of about 5,000 yd (4,600 m), although its effective range was only 800 yd (730 m)
To these were added five Unrotated Projectile (UP) launchers in 1940, each launcher carrying 20 3 inch (76 mm) rockets.
When they detonated the rockets shot out lengths of cables that were kept aloft by parachutes—the cable was intended to snag aircraft.
Six 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes were mounted on Hood's broadside. Two of these were submerged forward of 'A' turret's magazine and the other four were above water, abaft the rear funnel.
Hood was completed with two fire-control directors. One was mounted above the conning tower, protected by an armoured hood, and was fitted with a 30-foot (9.1 m) rangefinder. The other was fitted in the spotting top above the tripod foremast and equipped with a 15-foot (4.6 m) rangefinder. Each turret was also fitted with a 30 foot rangefinder. The secondary armament was primarily controlled by directors mounted on each side of the bridge. They were supplemented by two additional control positions in the fore-top, which were provided with 9-foot (2.7 m) rangefinders, although these do not seem to have been fitted until 1924–25.
The anti-aircraft guns were controlled by a simple high-angle 2-metre (6 ft 7 in) rangefinder mounted on the aft control position, although this does not seem to have been fitted until 1926–27. Three torpedo-control towers were fitted, each with 15 foot rangefinder. One was on each side of the amidships control tower and the third was on the centreline wikt:abaft the after control position.
During the 1929–31 refit a High-Angle Control System (HACS) Mark I director was added on the rear searchlight platform and two positions for 2 pounder "pom-pom" anti-aircraft directors were added at the rear the spotting top, although only one director was initially fitted.
The 5.5 inch control positions and their rangefinders on the spotting top were removed during the 1932 refit. In 1934 the "pom-pom" directors were moved to the former locations of the 5.5 inch control positions on the spotting top and the 9 foot rangefinders for the 5.5 inch control positions were reinstalled on the signal platform. Two years later the "pom-pom" directors were moved to the rear corners of the bridge to get them out of the funnel gases. Another "pom-pom" director was added on the rear superstructure, abaft the HACS director in 1938. Two HACS Mark III directors were added to the aft end of the signal platform the following year and the Mark I director aft was replaced by a Mark III.
During Hood's last refit in 1941 a Type 279 air warning radar and a Type 284 gunnery radar were installed.
Hood's armour scheme was originally based on that of the battlecruiser Tiger with an 8-inch (203 mm) waterline belt. Unlike Tiger the armour was angled outwards 12° from the waterline to increase its relative thickness in relation to flat-trajectory shells. This change did, however, increase the ship's vulnerability to plunging shells as it exposed more of the vulnerable deck armour. 5,000 long tons (5,100 t) of armour was added to the design in late 1916, based on experiences from the Battle of Jutland in mid-1916 at the cost of deeper draught and slightly decreased speed. To save time this was generally accomplished by thickening the existing armour rather than redesigning the entire ship.
Her protection accounted for 33% of her displacement; a high proportion by British standards, although less than was usual in contemporary German designs (for example, 36% for the battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg).
The armoured belt consisted of face-hardened, Krupp cemented armour (KC), arranged in three strakes. The main waterline belt was 12 in (305 mm) thick between 'A' and 'Y' barbettes and thinned to 5 to 6 in (127 to 152 mm) towards the ships' ends, but did not reach either the bow or the stern. The middle armour belt had a maximum thickness of 7 in (178 mm) inches over the same length as the thickest part of the waterline armour and thinned to 5 inches (127 mm) abreast 'A' barbette. The upper belt was 5 in (127 mm) thick amidships and extended forward to 'A' barbette, with a short 4 in (102 mm) extension aft.
The gun turrets and barbettes were protected by 11 to 15 inches (279 to 381 mm) of KC armour, except for the turret roofs which were five inches thick. The decks were made of high tensile steel. The forecastle deck ranged from 1.75 to 2 inches (44 to 51 mm) in thickness while the upper deck was 2 inches (51 mm) thick over the magazines and 0.75 inches (19 mm) elsewhere. The main deck was 3 inches (76 mm) thick over the magazines and 1 inch (25 mm) elsewhere, except for the 2 inches (51 mm) slope meeting the bottom of the main belt. The lower deck was 3 inches thick over the propeller shafts, 2 inches thick over the magazines and 1 inch elsewhere.
The 3 inch plating on the main deck was added at a very late stage of construction and the four aftermost 5.5 inch guns and their ammunition hoists were removed in compensation. Live firing trials with the new 15-inch APC (armour-piercing, capped) shell against a mockup of Hood showed that this shell could penetrate the ship's vitals via the 7 inch middle belt and the 2 inch slope of the main deck. A proposal was made to increase the armour over the forward magazines to 5 inches and 6 inches over the rear magazines in July 1919 in response to these trials. To compensate for the additional weight, the forward torpedo tubes and the armour for the rear torpedo tubes were removed, and the armour for the rear torpedo-control tower was reduced in thickness from 6 inches to 1.5 inches. However, the additional armour was never fitted pending further trials.
As completed, Hood remained susceptible to plunging (high-trajectory) shells and bombs.
For protection against torpedoes she was given a 7.5-foot (2.3 m) deep anti-torpedo bulge that ran the length of the ship between the fore and aft barbettes. It was divided into two compartments, the outer of which was left empty, but the inner compartment was filled with five rows of water-tight "crushing tubes" intended to absorb and distribute the force of an explosion more widely. The bulge was backed by a 1.5-inch (38 mm) thick torpedo bulkhead.
Hood was initially fitted with flying-off platforms mounted on the roofs of 'B' and 'X' turrets from which Fairey Flycatchers are known to have been flown.
During her 1929–31 refit the platform was removed from 'X' turret and a trainable, folding F IV H catapult was installed on her quarterdeck along with a crane to recover the seaplane. She embarked a Fairey IIIF from No. 444 Flight of the Royal Air Force. During the 1932 West Indies cruise the catapult proved to be difficult to operate in anything but a calm sea as it was frequently awash in bad weather and was removed in 1932, along with its associated crane. The flying-off platform on 'B' turret was removed about the same time.
Construction of Hood began at the John Brown & Company shipyards in Clydebank, Scotland, on 1 September 1916. Following the loss of three British battlecruisers at the Battle of Jutland, 5,000 tons of extra armour and bracing was added to Hood's design.
Most seriously, the deck protection was flawed—spread over three decks, it was designed to detonate an incoming shell on impact with the top deck, with much of the energy being absorbed as the exploding shell had to penetrate the armour of the next two decks. The development of effective time-delay shells at the end of World War I made this scheme much less effective, as the intact shell would penetrate layers of weak armour and explode deep inside the ship.In addition, she was grossly overweight compared to her original design, making her a wet ship with a highly stressed structure.
She was launched on 22 August 1918 by the widow of Rear-Admiral Sir Horace Hood, a great-great-grandson of the famous Admiral Samuel Hood for whom the ship was named and who was killed while commanding the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron and flying his flag in HMS Invincible—one of the three battlecruisers which blew up at the Battle of Jutland. After fitting-out and trials, she was commissioned on 15 May 1920, under Captain Wilfred Tomkinson, C.B., and became flagship of the British Atlantic Fleet's Battle Cruiser Squadron. She had cost £6,025,000 to build.
With her conspicuous twin funnels and lean profile, Hood was widely conceded one of the finest-looking warships ever built.
Although the Royal Navy always designated Hood as a battlecruiser, some modern writers such as Anthony Preston have classified her as a fast battleship, since the Hood appeared to have improvements over the revolutionary Queen Elizabeth-class battleships.
On paper, the Hood retained the same armament and level of protection, while being significantly faster. Around 1918, the US naval staff in Great Britain became extremely impressed by the Hood which was described as a "fast battleship", so they advocated that the US Navy develop a fast battleship of its own. However, the US continued with their established design direction, the slower but well-protected South Dakota-class battleship and the fast and lightly armoured Lexington-class battlecruisers
Influences from Hood showed on subsequent Lexington designs, with the reduction of the main armour belt, the change to "sloped armour", and the addition of four above-water torpedo tubes which were added to the four underwater tubes of the original design.
To add to the confusion, Royal Navy documents of the period often describe any battleship with a speed of over about 24 knots (44 km/h) as a battlecruiser, regardless of the amount of protective armour. For instance, the never-built G3 battlecruiser was classified as such though it would have been more of a fast battleship than the Hood.
On the other hand, the scale of Hood's protection, though adequate for the Jutland era, was at best marginal against the new generation of 16-inch (406 mm) gunned capital ships that emerged soon after her completion in 1920, typified by the US Colorado-class and the Japanese Nagato class battleship. The Royal Navy were fully aware that the Hood's protection flaws still remained, even in her revised design, so Hood was intended for the duties of a battlecruiser and she served in the battlecruiser squadrons throughout most of her career.
Late in her career, the Hood was clearly outclassed by the armour/protective arrangement of WWII-era true fast battleships. However, in sending the Hood against the modern German battleship Bismarck in 1941, the Admiralty did so because of their few available "big gun" vessels with enough speed to possibly catch Bismarck, and likely also because of the reputation and legend of the "Mighty Hood".
Shortly after commissioning on 15 May 1920 Hood became flagship of the Battlecruiser Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet, under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. She made a cruise to Scandinavian waters that year. She visited the Mediterranean in 1921 and 1922 to show the flag and to train with the Mediterranean Fleet, before sailing on a cruise to Brazil and the West Indies in company with the Battlecruiser Squadron.
In November 1923 Hood, accompanied by the battlecruiser Repulse and a number of Danae-class cruisers of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, set out on a world cruise from west to east via the Panama Canal. They returned home ten months later in September 1924. The Battlecruiser Squadron visited Lisbon in January 1925 to participate in the Vasco da Gama celebrations before continuing on the Mediterranean for exercises. Hood would continue this pattern of a winter training visit to the Mediterranean for the rest of the decade.
Hood was given a major refit from 1 May 1929 to 10 March 1931 and afterwards resumed her role as flagship of the Battlecruiser Squadron. Later that year her crew participated in the Invergordon Mutiny over pay cuts for the sailors. It ended peacefully and Hood returned to her home port afterwards. The Battlecruiser Squadron made a Caribbean cruise in early 1932 and Hood was given another brief refit between 31 March and 10 May at Portsmouth. The next year she resumed her previous practice of a winter cruise in the Mediterranean. Her secondary and anti-aircraft fire-control directors were rearranged during another quick refit between 1 August and 5 September 1934. While enroute to Gibraltar for one of these cruises she collided with the battlecruiser Renown on 23 January 1935, but was only lightly damaged. Nonetheless she was temporarily repaired at Gibraltar before sailing to Portsmouth for permanent repairs between February and May 1935. Hood participated in King George V's Silver Jublilee Fleet Review at Spithead the following August. She was attached to the Mediterranean Fleet shortly afterward and stationed at Gibraltar at the outbreak of the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Hood returned to Portsmouth for a brief refit between 26 June and 10 October 1936. She formally transferred to the Mediterranean Fleet on 20 October, shortly after the beginning of the Spanish Civil War.
On 23 April 1937 she escorted three British merchantmen into Bilbao harbour despite the presence of the Nationalist cruiser Almirante Cervera that attempted to blockade the port.
She returned to Portsmouth in January 1939 for an overhaul that lasted until 12 August.
Hood was due to be modernised in 1941 to bring her up to a standard similar to that of other modernised World War I-era capital ships. She would have received new lighter machinery, a secondary armament of eight twin 5.25 inch guns and six octuple 2-pounder pom-poms. A catapult would have been fitted across the deck and the remaining torpedo tubes removed. In addition the conning tower would have been removed and the bridge rebuilt.
Her near-constant active service, resulting from her status as the Royal Navy's most battleworthy fast capital ship, meant that her material condition gradually deteriorated, and by the end of the 1930s she was in poor condition and in need of refitting. The outbreak of World War II made it impossible to remove her from service, and as a consequence she never received the scheduled reconstruction afforded to other capital ships such as the battlecruiser Renown and several of the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships. Her condition meant, among other things, that she was unable to attain her top designed speed.
In June 1939, Hood was assigned to the Home Fleet’s Battlecruiser Squadron while still refitting; when war broke out later that year, she was employed principally in patrolling the vicinity of Iceland and the Faroe Islands to protect convoys and intercept German raiders attempting to break out into the Atlantic. In September 1939, she was hit by a 250 kg (550 lb) aircraft bomb with minor damage. By early 1940 Hood's machinery was in dire shape and limited her best speed to 26.5 knots (49.1 km/h; 30.5 mph); she was refitted between 4 April and 12 June.
Hood and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal were ordered to Gibraltar to join Force H on 18 June where Hood became the flagship. As such, she took part in the destruction of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir in July 1940. Just eight days after the French surrender, the British Admiralty had issued an ultimatum to the French Fleet at Oran to ensure they would not fall into German or Italian hands. The terms were rejected and the Royal Navy opened fire on the French ships berthed there. The results of Hood's fire are not known exactly, but she damaged the French battleship Dunkerque, which was hit by four fifteen-inch shells and was forced to beach herself. Hood was straddled during the engagement by Dunkerque; shell splinters wounded two men. Dunkerque's sister ship Strasbourg managed to escape from the harbour and Hood with several light cruisers gave chase, but gave up after two hours after Hood had dodged a salvo of torpedoes from a French sloop and she had stripped a turbine reaching 28 knots (52 km/h; 32 mph).
Hood was relieved as flagship of Force H by Renown on 10 August after returning to Scapa Flow. On 13 September, after a short refit, she was sent to Rosyth along with the battleships Nelson and Rodney and other ships, to be in a better position to intercept an invasion fleet. When the threat of an invasion diminished she resumed her previous roles in patrolling against German commerce raiders and convoy escort. Twice Hood was dispatched against enemy warships. On 28 October she sailed to intercept the "pocket battleship" Admiral Scheer and heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper on 24 December, but she failed to find either ship. This lasted until January 1941 when she began a refit that lasted until March; even after the refit she was still in poor condition, but the threat from the German capital ships was such that she could not be taken into dock for a major overhaul until more of the King George V-class battleships came into service.. Upon its completion she was ordered to sea in an attempt to intercept the German battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Unsuccessful, she was ordered to patrol the Bay of Biscay against any breakout attempt by the German ships from Brest. Hood was ordered to the Norwegian Sea on 19 April when the Admiralty received a false report that the German battleship Bismarck had sailed from Germany. Afterwards she patrolled the North Atlantic before putting in to Scapa Flow on 6 May.
When the German battleship Bismarck sailed for the Atlantic in May 1941, Hood, together with the newly-commissioned battleship Prince of Wales, was sent out in pursuit, along with several other groups of British capital ships to intercept the German ships before they could break into the Atlantic and attack Allied convoys. Hood was commanded by Captain Ralph Kerr and flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Lancelot Holland. The German ships were spotted by two British heavy cruisers on the 23rd May and Holland’s ships caught up with Bismarck and her consort, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, in the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland on 24 May.
The British squadron spotted the Germans at 05:37 a.m., but the Germans were already aware of their presence, Prinz Eugen' hydrophones already having detected the sounds of high-speed propellers to their southeast. The British opened fire at 05:52 with Hood engaging Prinz Eugen, the lead ship in the German formation, and the Germans returned fire 05:55, both ships concentrating on Hood. Prinz Eugen (probably) was the first ship to score when a shell hit Hood's boat deck, between her funnels, and started a large fire among the ready-use ammunition for the anti-aircraft guns and rockets of the Unrotated Projectile mounts.
Right before 06:00, while Hood was turning 20° to port to unmask her rear turrets, she was hit again on the boat deck by one or more shells from Bismarck's fifth salvo, fired from a range of approximately 16,650 metres (18,210 yd).
This same shell, or another from the same salvo, appears to have hit the spotting top as the boat deck was showered with body parts and debris.
Almost immediately, a huge jet of flame burst out of Hood from the vicinity of the mainmast.
This was followed by a devastating magazine explosion that destroyed the after part of the ship. This explosion broke the back of Hood and the last sight of the ship, which sank in only three minutes, was her bow, nearly vertical in the water.
Of the 1,418 crew, only three men (Ted Briggs (1923–2008), Robert Tilburn (1921–1995) and William John Dundas (1921–1965)) survived; they were rescued about two and a half hours after the sinking by the destroyer Electra. Memorials to the those who died are spread widely around the UK, and some of the crew are memorialised in different locations. One such casualty, George David Spinner, is remembered on the Portsmouth Naval memorial, the Hood Chapel at the Church of St John the Baptist, in Boldre in Hampshire, and also upon the gravestone of his brother, who died whilst serving in the Royal Air Force in 1942, in the Hamilton Road Cemetery, Deal, Kent.
The official Admiralty communiqué on the loss, broadcast on the day of the sinking, reported that: "during the ... action, HMS Hood ... received an unlucky hit in a magazine and blew up.
The first formal Board of Enquiry into the loss, presided over by Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake, reported on 2 June (less than a fortnight after the loss). It endorsed this opinion, stating that:
(c) (The) probable cause of the loss of HMS Hood was direct penetration of the protection by one or more 15-inch shells at a range of 16,500 yards (15,100 m), resulting in the explosion of one or more of the after magazines.
However, the conduct of the enquiry became subject to criticism, primarily because no verbatim record of witness' testimony had been kept. Moreover, Sir Stanley Goodall, the Director of Naval Construction (DNC), had come forward with an alternative theory, that the Hood had been destroyed by the explosion of her own torpedoes. As a result, a second Board was convened (under Rear-Admiral Sir Harold Walker), reporting in September 1941.
This investigation was “much more thorough than was the first, taking evidence from a total of 176 eyewitnesses to the disaster”, and examined both Goodall’s theory and others (see below). The Board came to a conclusion almost identical to that of the first board, expressed as follows:
That the sinking of Hood was due to a hit from Bismarck's 15-inch shell in or adjacent to Hood's 4-inch or 15-inch magazines, causing them all to explode and wreck the after part of the ship. The probability is that the 4-inch magazines exploded first.
The same two Boards of Enquiry exonerated Vice-Admiral Holland from any blame regarding the loss of Hood.
The exact cause of the loss of HMS Hood remains a subject of debate. The principal theories include the following causes:
A direct hit from a shell penetrated to a magazine aft. Such a shell could only have come from the Bismarck, since the Prinz Eugen was no longer firing at the Hood at the time of the explosion. As noted above, this version of events was almost taken for granted at the time of the sinking. Doubt first arose as a result of eyewitness testimony that the explosion that destroyed Hood originated near the mainmast, well forward of the aft magazines (for example, the sketch shown prepared for the second board of enquiry by Captain Leach of Prince of Wales). At the second Board, expert witnesses suggested that what was observed was the venting, through the engine-room ventilators, of a violent—but not instantaneous—explosion or deflagration in the 4-inch magazines. The same deflagration would have collapsed the bulkhead separating the 4-inch and 15-inch magazines, resulting very quickly in a catastrophic explosion similar to those previously witnessed at Jutland. This theory was ultimately adopted by the Board.
A shell, falling short and travelling underwater, struck below the armoured belt and penetrated to a magazine. During the same action, the Prince of Wales received a hit of this type from a 38 cm (c.15 in) shell, which travelled underwater for about 80 feet (25 m), struck about 28 feet (8 m) below the waterline, penetrated several light bulkheads and fetched up, without exploding, against the torpedo bulkhead. The second Board considered this theory improbable, arguing that the fuse, had it worked at all, would have detonated the shell before it reached the ship.
The ship was destroyed by the explosion of her own torpedoes. According to Goodall’s theory, the ship's torpedoes could have been detonated either by the fire raging on the boat deck or, more probably, by a direct hit from Bismarck. This would have blown out the side of the ship, destroying the girder strength of the hull; the force of water entering the hole, at a speed of nearly 30 knots, would then shear the stern section from the rest of the hull.
The fire on the boat deck penetrated to a magazine. Evidence given to the second Board indicated that the doors for the 4 inch ammunition supply trucks were closed throughout the action. It remains possible that a door or trunk could have been opened up by an enemy shell, admitting flames to the magazine. Alternative routes for admission of flame could have been the ventilation or venting arrangements of the magazines or, as Ted Briggs suggested, through the floor of a 15-inch gunhouse.
The explosion was initiated by 4-inch ammunition stored outside the magazines. Writing in 1979, the naval historian Antony Preston claimed that the after magazines of Hood were "surrounded by additional 4-inch (102 mm) anti-aircraft shells outside the armoured barbettes. Such unprotected stowage could have been detonated either by the boat-deck fire or by a shell from Bismarck.
The ship was blown up by her own guns. At the second board, eyewitnesses reported unusual types of discharge from the 15-inch guns of Hood, suggesting that a shell could have detonated within the gun, causing an explosion within the gunhouse. It is possible that, under the stress of combat, the safety measures, introduced after the disasters at Jutland to prevent such an explosion reaching the magazines, could have failed.
An extensive review of these theories (excepting that of Preston) is given in Jurens's 1987 article. Its main conclusion is that the loss was almost certainly precipitated by the explosion of a 4-inch magazine, but that there are a number of ways in which this could have been initiated. In Jurens' opinion, the popular image of "plunging fire" penetrating deck-armour of Hood is inaccurate, as by his estimation the angle of fall of Bismarck's 38 cm shells at the moment of the loss would not have exceeded about 14 degrees, an angle so unfavourable to penetration of horizontal armour that it is actually off the scale of contemporary German penetration charts. Moreover, computer-generated profiles of the Hood show that a shell falling at this angle could not have reached an aft magazine without first passing through some part of the belt-armour. On the other hand, the 12-inch (305 mm) belt could have been penetrated, if the Hood had progressed sufficiently far into her final turn.
A more recent development is the discovery of the Hood's wreck (see below). Inspection of the wreck has confirmed that the aft magazines did indeed explode. The stern of the Hood was located, with the rudders still in place, and it was found that these were set to port at the time of the explosion. Furthermore, a section of the bow immediately forward of 'A' turret is missing, which has led historian and former Dartmouth lecturer Eric J. Grove and expedition leader David Mearns to believe that "either just before or just after leaving the surface, the bow suffered massive internal damage from an internal explosion",possibly a partial detonation of the forward 15-inch magazines. It has been suggested that the fatal fire spread from the aft end of the ship through the starboard fuel tanks, since the starboard side of Hood "appears to be missing most, if not all of its torpedo bulge plating".
The evidence of the wreck refutes Goodall's theory, while the eyewitness evidence of venting from the 4 inch magazine prior to the main explosion conflicts with the theory that the Hood was blown up by her own guns. The other theories listed above remain valid possibilities.
The wreck of Hood was discovered in 2,700 metres (8,900 ft) of water in July 2001 by an expedition funded by UK-based Channel Four Television and ITN and led by shipwreck hunter David Mearns.
In 2002 the site was officially designated a war grave by the British government. As such, it remains a protected place under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986.
Hood's wreck lies on the seabed in pieces among two debris fields. The eastern field includes the tiny amount of the stern which survived the magazine explosion as well as the surviving section of the bow and some smaller remains such as the screws. The 4-inch fire director lies in the western debris field. The heavily armoured conning tower is located by itself a distance from the main wreck. The amidships section, the biggest part of the wreck to survive the explosions, lies inverted south of the eastern debris field in a large impact crater. The starboard side of the amidships section is missing down to the inner wall of the fuel tanks and the plates of the hull are curling outward; this has been interpreted as indicating the path of the explosion through the starboard fuel tanks. It is further supposed that the small debris fields are the fragments from the after hull where the magazines and turrets were located, since that section of the hull was totally destroyed in the explosion. The fact that the bow section separated just forward of 'A' turret provoked the suggestion that a secondary explosion might have occurred in this area.
Other researchers have claimed that the final salvo fired by Hood was not a salvo at all, but flame from the forward magazine explosion, which gave the illusion of Hood opening fire for the last time.
This damage being ahead of the armoured bulkhead, could easily have been implosion damage suffered while Hood sank, as a torpedo room that had been removed at one of her recent refits approximates the site of the break. However it was the opinion of Mearns and White that investigated the wreck that this was unlikely as the damage was far too limited in scale, nor could it account for the outward splayed plates also observed in that area.
Bill Jurens, however, points out that there was no magazine of any kind at the location of the break and that the location of the break just forward of the forward transverse armoured bulkhead suggests that the ship's structure failed there as a result of stresses inflicted when the bow was lifted into the vertical position by the sinking stern section. Furthermore the current outwards position of the plates at the edge of the break only reflects their last position, not the direction that they first moved.
The forward section lies on its port side, with the amidship section keel up. Of interest is the stern section which actually rises from the seabed at an angle. This position clearly shows the rudder locked into a 20 degree port turn, confirming that orders had been given (just prior to the aft magazines detonating) to change the ship's heading and bring the aft turrets 'X' and 'Y' to bear on the German ships.
INCROCIATORE DA BATTAGLIA H.M.S. HOOD / BATTLECRUISER HMS HOOD
NAVI DA GUERRA / WARSHIPS AND BATTLESHIPS
